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I. INTRODUCTION
As the Ontario economy expanded over the last four decades, it
became quite obvious that the laws governing vital aspects of business
activity had become a "tangled mass.", The Ontario Personal Property
Security Act,2 which is based on the 1962 version of Article 9 of the
United States Uniform Commercial Code (uCC),3 was introduced in Ontario
to clear away this chaos. The Act consolidates, simplifies, clarifies, and
modernizes the law of secured transactions so that it is in harmony with
sound business practices.4 The Act goes a long way toward meeting this
objective. However, one of a number of obstacles in this otherwise happy
road to encouraging and facilitating commercial transactions has been
I F.M. Catzman et al., Personal Property Security Law in Ontario (Toronto: Carswell, 1976)
at 1.
2 R.S.O. 1980, c. 375, as am. S.O. 1981, c. 2 & c. 58 [hereinafter PPSA]. All section references
to the Act or the PPSA or not otherwise identified are to the Ontario PPSA.
3 National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, Uniform Commercial Code"
1962 Official Text With Comments (Philadelphia: American Law Institute, 1963) [hereinafter 1962
Code].
4 The comprehensiveness of the PPSA can best be demonstrated by the acts that it replaces:
the Assignment of Book Debts Act, R.S.O. 1970, c. 33; the Bills of Sale and Chattel Mortgages Act,
R.S.O. 1970, c. 45 (except as to sales); and the Conditional Sales Act, R.S.O. 1970, c. 76. See
also Catzman et aL, supra, note 1 at 2 where a list of other statutes affected in part by the PPSA
can be found.
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the operation of section 36, the fixture section. Section 36 purports to
resolve conflicts arising between a person who claims an interest in real
estate, including any fixtures thereon, and one who claims an interest
against a particular fixture. In determining the priorities among realty
and fixture interests, section 36 is one of the few exceptions5 to the
general rule that the PPSA is concerned only with personal property and
has no impact upon the law of real property.
On a policy level, the fixture section appears to balance fairly the
reliance interest of both the real estate and fixture parties and expands
the protection previously available to the latter under the Conditional
Sales Act.6 As will become evident, the PPSA encourages the commitment
of new capital to the improvement of real estate and the modernization
and expansion of industry while at the same time protecting the capital
that has already been committed.
Unfortunately, the formulation of the section is expected to generate
a bewildering assortment of problems with respect to fixture determi-
nation, perfection and real estate notification, construction mortgages,
tenants' fixtures, and fixtures installed by contractors.7 These problems,
which have been selected for the present discussion, are not necessarily
the most difficult or the most intellectually stimulating. They are, however,
likely to arise in significant numbers because they are latent in a large
proportion of fixture transactions.
Although few cases have been decided under the section 8
and little has been written about the treatment of fixtures in
5 Only ss l(r), 1(y), 3(1)(e)(i) & (ii), 36, 36a, 54 & 56(6) touch on real estate matters. Sections
l(k), 10(b), 12(2)(a) & (d), 13(2)(a), 34 & 54 deal with crops or timber.
6 Supra, note 4, s. 10(1), which provided that
where the goods, other than building material [sic], have been affixed to realty, they remain
subject to the rights of the seller as fully as they were before being so affixed, but the
owner of the realty or any purchaser or any mortgagee or other encumbrancer thereof has
the right, as against the seller or other person claiming through or under him, to retain
the goods upon payment of the amount owing on them.
7 This is only a partial list of the problems that are likely to emerge out of s. 36. For additional
problems, see the comprehensive article by D.F. Adams, "Security Interests in Fixtures Under
Mississippi's Uniform Commercial Code" (1976) 47 Miss. LJ. 831.
8 R.H. McLaren and K. de Jong, Secured Transactions in Personal Property in Canada, vols.
1-3 (Toronto: Carswell, loose-leaf, Release No. 25, December 1986) at §§ 6.03[2][b], 6.06[2][b]
& 6.09[2][b] [hereinafter McLaren I] cites six cases: Charles A Hare Ltd v. Payn (1982), 2 P.P.S.A.C.
93 (Ont. S.C.) [hereinafter Charles A Hare Lid] (a motor truck scale); Cormier v. Federal Business
Development Bank (1983), 3 P.P.S.A.C. 161 (Ont. Co. CL) [hereinafter Cormier] (equipment installed
in a tenant's place of business); Assiniboine Credit Union Ltd v. C.LB.C. (1984), 4 P.P.S.A.C. 96
(Man. C.A.) (a house); Manning v. Furnasman Heating Ltd (1985), 4 P.P.S.A.C. 246 (Man. Q.B.),
aff'd on other grounds, 5 P.P.S.A.C. 67 (Man. C.A.) [hereinafter Manning] (gas furnace, water
heater, ductwork, eavestroughing, and pipes); Dolan v. Bank of Montreal (1985), 5 P.P.S.A.C. 196
(Sask. C.A.) (a mobile home); and Leslie and Palmer Co. v. Hydrogrowers Corporation (1986), 5
P.P.S.A.C. 292 (Ont. Dist. CL) (an electrical substation and related pole-mounted equipment). Only
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Ontario9 and in the other Canadian PPSA jurisdictions, 0 this is no reason
for maintaining the status quo. Indeed, Article 9-313 of the 1962 Code
(the precedent for section 36 of the PPSA) has provoked much criticism
in the United States." Eminent commentators and members of the U.S.
the Cormier case really considers and applies the provisions in s. 36. In Manning, the Manitoba
Queen's Bench applied s. 36 of the Manitoba PPSA in respect of goods affixed by contractors,
but the Court of Appeal decided the case without relying on the fixture provision. This particular
problem is examined later in this article; see Part VI, "Goods Affixed By Contractors," infra.
Professor Gilmore has queried why there has been so little litigation on this subject since
1940 (see G. Gilmore, "The Purchase Money Priority" (1963) 76 Harv. L. Rev. 1333 at 1363).
Three reasons have been suggested to explain this phenomenon. First, the law of secured transactions
is traditionally tested only after prolonged periods of economic depression, which is not fully reflected
in either ucc or PPSA case law (see P.F. Coogan et aL, Secured Transactions under the Uniform
Commercial Code, vol. 1 (New York: Matthew Bender, loose-leaf, 1986) at § 3A.01 [hereinafter
Coogan 1]; R.D. Henson, Handbook On Secured Transactions Under the Uniform Commercial Code,
2d ed. (St. Paul: West, 1979) at 292-93). Second, conflicts between fixture security interests and
land mortgages have been rare over the last forty years because rising land values have ensured
that the building and the fixture together have, or will have in the future, sufficient value to cover
both debts (see M.G. Shanker, "An Integrated Financing System For Purchase Money Collateral:
A Proposed Solution to the Fixture Problem Under Section 9-313 of the Uniform Commercial
Code" (1964) 73 Yale L.. 788 at 792). Finally, because of the number of difficulties inherent
in this section, the various competing parties have drafted agreements that attempt to overcome
many of the problems (see R.H. McLaren, "O.P.P.S.A. as it Affects Chattels, Fixtures and Leasehold
Improvements" in H.M. Haber, ed., Shopping Centre Leases A Collection Of Articles and Precedents,
vol. 2 (Agincourt, Ont.: Canada Law Book, 1982) 225 at 267 [hereinafter McLaren II]).
9 See McLaren II, ibid; Report of the Pers-Real Committee of the Real Property Section (Toronto:
Canadian Bar Association (Ontario Division), 1982) at 13-21 [hereinafter Pers-Real Report]; B.
Crawford, "A Practitioner's Notes Upon the Ontario Personal Property Security Act" (1975-76)
1 Can. Bus. LJ. 269 at 306-9; Catzman et al, supra, note 1 at 159-63, 209-11. See generally
McLaren I,ibid at § 6.03[2][b] (Ontario), § 6.06[2][b] (Manitoba) and § 6.09[2][b] (Saskatchewan
& Yukon).
10 In addition to Ontario, personal property security legislation has been enacted in Manitoba
(S.M. 1973, c. 5) [proclaimed in force September 1, 1978], Saskatchewan (S.S. 1979-80, c. P.6.1,
as am.) [proclaimed in force May 1, 1981], and the Yukon Territory (S.Y.T. 1980 (2d), c. 20)
[proclaimed in force June 1, 1982]. Other provinces have also shown a great deal of interest in
enacting personal property security legislation of their own. For a discussion of Alberta's most
recent attempt, see R.C.C. Cuming, "Alberta Moves toward Enactment of a Personal Property
Security Act" (1985) 11 Can. Bus. L.J. 82.
11 Of the fifty-one jurisdictions (the District of Columbia, the Virgin Islands, and all of the
states except Louisiana) to adopt the 1962 Code, thirty-six have departed from its treatment of
fixtures because they found its provisions extreme or ambiguous. While many of the changes were
inconsequential, others were more fundamental. For example, Ohio initially accepted the official
Code but after a year rewrote the section to reverse its general policy, returning the state to its
pre-Code law of priorities. California simply refused to adopt § 9-313 when it enacted the Code
because it feared that the section would only further confuse California law on fixtures: CaL Comm.
Code Ann. § 9-313 (St. Paul: West, 1964). For other individual state variations from the 1962
Code, see ucc Report Service: State Correlation Tables (Mundelein, Ill.: ucc Report Service, 1979).
As well, when real estate lenders began to realize the impact of the fixture provision on real
estate financing, they were displeased not only with § 9-313's ambiguity but also with the substantial
change from prior law and the lack of adequate safeguards for real estate interests (eg., construction
mortgagees): see Permanent Editorial Board for the UCC, Review Comm. for Article 9, Reasons
for Change (Final Draft 1971).
The need for clarification and re-evaluation was also voiced by commentators and members
of the bar see, for example, G. Gilmore, Security Interests in Personal Property, vol. 2 (Boston:
Brown, Little, 1965) at 801; P.F. Coogan etaL,supra, note 8, vol. 1B, c. 16A, 17A & 17B [hereinafter
Coogan IB]; H. Kripke, "Fixtures Under the Uniform Commercial Code" (1964) 64 Colum. L.
Rev. 44; Shanker, supra, note 8.
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Bar generally agree that every subsection of Article 9-313 except
subsection 9-313(5), which is comparable to section 36(4) of the PPSA,
is either ambiguous, incomplete, or challengeable on policy grounds.12
Such vagueness in the PPSA is not acceptable when the provisions of
a security agreement will only be tested after the normal business
relationship is strained to the point where no resolution can be achieved
through an adjustment of mutual interests. Even if the debtor and secured
party are willing to make their own bargain after problems have arisen,
they will be restrained from doing so because the Act will by that time
have become fully operative and the rights of third parties (for example,
the trustee in bankruptcy and the other parties listed in section 22) will
also have to be considered.13
As a result, in 1971 the sponsors of the United States uCC approved
substantial changes to Article 9's fixture-related provisions, which are
embodied in the 1972 version of the Code.'4 In contrast, in Ontario,
the Advisory Committee for the Ministry of Consumer and Commercial
Relations has recently recommended only afew amendments with respect
to the fixture section and most are procedural rather than substantive.5
In the author's opinion, the section fails to meet the fundamental aims
of the Act.' 6 "to provide rules under which commercial transactions can
be conducted with reasonable simplicity and certainty"' 7 and "to be
responsive to the needs of [a] modem economy."' 8 This paper will,
therefore, compare Ontario's current and proposed treatment of security
interests in fixtures with both the 1962 and the 1972 Codes in the hope
that the comparison will highlight the desirability of further amending
section 36 of the PPSA.
12 See, eg., . Gordon, "Credit Sales of Installed Equipment - The Uniform Commercial
Code's Uneasy Truce Between Realty and Chattel Financing Interests" (1970) 64 Nw. U.L. Rev.
651 at 661.
13 Coogan 1, supra, note 8 at § 3A.01.
14 National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, Uniform Commercial Code-
1972 Official Text With Comments and Appendix (Philadelphia: American Law Institute, 1973)
[hereinafter 1972 Code]. As of January 1986, forty-six jurisdictions had adopted the 1972 Code.
See Bender's Uniform Commercial Code Service, Secured Transactions under the Uniform Commercial
Code: 1986 Cumulative Supplement (Albany, New York: Matthew Bender & Co., 1986).
15 Ontario, Report of the Minister's Advisory Committee on the Personal Property Security Act
(Toronto: Ministry of Consumer & Commercial Relations, 1984) at 54-55 [hereinafter 1984 Draft
Act]; Ontario, Supplementary Report of the Minister's Advisory Committee on the Personal Property
Security Act (Toronto: Ministry of Consumer & Commercial Relations, 1985) at 47-49 [hereinafter
1985 Draft Act]. In the 1985 Draft Act, no changes were made to the text dealing with fixtures
from that proposed in the 1984 Draft Act.
16 This negative assessment of the fixture provision is based on the assorted problems inherent
in the section. See note 7, supra and accompanying text.
17 Catzman et aL, supra, note 1 at 3.
18 Ibid. at 13.
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II. THE MEANING OF FIXTURES
Legislative efforts in the United States to create a meaningful
definition of the term 'fixtures' have proved unsuccessful.' 9 Perhaps
because of the previous failures, those who drafted the 1962 Code decided
not to define this term. There is substantial disagreement among those
who have commented on the 1962 Code about the seriousness of the
omission.20 Even if such a definition could be composed, it would probably
create more problems than it solves. First, an all-embracing definition
would soon become outmoded as technology continually spawns new
fixtures and methods of installation.2' Second, given the variability of
fact patterns and the emotional appeals of different types of claimants,
one would expect that each case would ultimately be decided on its
particular facts.22 Thus, it would be unwise to freeze in statutory form
what must vary with time and place. As a result, in all of the provinces
19 See, ag., the definition of fixtures in the Ga. Code Ann. § 85-105 (1933):
[A]nything intended to remain permanently in its place, though not actually attached to
the land, such as a rail fence, is a part of the realty and passes with it. Machinery, not
actually attached, but movable at pleasure, is not a part of the realty. Anything detached
from the realty becomes personalty instantly on being so detached.
As quoted in M.W. Macey, "Bringing Your Fixtures Up To Date" (1965) 16 Mercer L. Rev. 404
at 404 n. 2.
Recent legislative attempts in Canada have been no more successful. See s. 2(p) of the
Saskatchewan PPsA, supra, note 10, which defines "fixtures" to mean "goods that are installed
on or affixed to real property in such a manner or under such circumstances as to result in their
becoming in law fixtures to the realty, but does not include building materials." Essentially the
same definition is contained in s. 2(1) of the Yukon Personal Property Ordinance, supra, note 10.
20 Professor Gilmore concludes that no satisfactory definition of 'fixtures' can be developed
and that in any case multiple filings would overcome this problem: Gilmore, supra, note I I at
819-20. Mr. Coogan concludes, however, that a definition is essential, and he offers such a definition
(see Coogan IB, supra, note 11 at §§ 17.09, 17.14(2), 17.14(4)). Professor Kripke is wary of
any definition that depends on the degree of affixation and he suggests as an appropriate definition
"anything that would pass by a real estate conveyance by the owner of the property, but excluding
the sand, plaster, structural members, and so on, to which the rules of accommodation do not
apply" (see Kripke, supra, note 11 at 64). See also the definition drafted by Kripke for the Review
Committee's first published draft of the 1972 Code. Review Committee for Article 9 of the Uniform
Commercial Code, Permanent Editorial Board for the Uniform Commercial Code, Preliminary Draft
No. I (St. Paul: West, 1968), § 9-313(I)(bXi) as quoted in Coogan 1, supra, note 8 at § 3A.02[1]
n.42. Professor Cosway cynically writes that the "[s]election of a workable definition of the word
'fixture' is almost impossible, because the definition adopted will usually reflect a preconceived
judgment concerning the merits of the particular case." He therefore concludes that "defining the
term 'fixture' is much less significant than applying the definition to particular fact patterns.": R.
Cosway, "Fixtures Under The Uniform Commercial Code" (1967) 21 Sw. LJ. 713-14.
21 See, eg., Schiedell v. Burrows (1902), 1 0.W.R. 793 (Trial CL) where Mr. Justice Britton
suggested that the old rules applicable to fixtures were being relaxed because of the constant advances
that were being made with respect to trade machinery; Clark v. Brager (1934), [1934] 3 D.L,R.
265 at 270-71 (N.B.S.C.A.D.). See also Leigh v. Taylor (1902), [1902] A.C. 157 at 159 (H.L.),
Lord Halsbury.
22 See Report on Landlord and Tenant Law (Toronto: Ontario Law Reform Commission, 1976)
at 76 where the Commission wrote: "Difficulty in reconciling the judicial decisions on the subject
of fixtures arises from the heavy reliance of each decision upon the facts of the particular case."
See also Cosway, supra, note 20 at 713.
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except Quebec, the determination of when goods become fixtures is left
to the common law. 23 The PPSA does, however, provide that there cannot
be a chattel security interest in "building materials that have been affixed
to the realty."24
Taken as a whole, section 36 provides more insight into the meaning
of 'fixtures' than is apparent upon first reading. The PPSA envisions a
three-way classification of property: building materials; chattels that have
not become fixtures and remain personal property; and fixtures. 25 First,
'building materials' that have become so closely associated with realty
that they have lost their independent character are considered as realty
for all purposes ('pure realty'). Security interests in goods of this first
class are governed by real property law and not by the PPSA.26 Accordingly,
23 Unfortunately, the common law does not provide a very useful guide for the determination
of whether or not a chattel is a fixture. The inconsistency of the case law on fixtures has attracted
comment from at least three judges. In Carscallen v. Moodie (1857), 15 U.C.Q.B. 304 at 316
(C.A.), Robinson CJ. stated that
[i]t must be confessed that the language of the courts, in the multiplicity of cases respecting
fixtures, is full of apparent inconsistencies, arising in a great measure from the different
aspects in which the question happened to be presented, whether as between heir and executor,
vendor and vendee, tenant for life or in tail and the remainder man, or landlord and tenant;
and there are in truth many cases of which it is acknowledged that they are incapable
of being reconciled.
Similarly, Patterson J.A. in Keefer v. Merril (1880), 6 O.A.R. 121 at 136 stated-
I find it impossible to follow the discussion of the question, as it has arisen in a very large
number of cases, whether certain articles are or are not fixtures, with any confidence in
my ability to discover a principle that will satisfactorily apply to all cases. The distinctions
made are sometimes so fine as not to be easily perceptible, and I am inclined to think
that the task to bring all the decisions into harmony would be a hopeless one.
Most recently, McFarlane J.A. observed in LaSalle Recreations Ltd v. Canadian Camdex Investments
Ltd(1969),4 D.L.R. (3d) 549 at 553 (B.C.C.A.) [hereinafter LaSalle Recreations] that "lilt is probably
an understatement to say that it would be very difficult to reconcile many decisions relating to
this subject."
For a discussion of Canadian fixture law in general, see F.W. Rhodes, Williams and Rhodes
on Canadian Law of Landlord and Tenant, vol. 2, 5th ed. (Toronto: Carswell, loose-leaf, Release
No. 15, 1986) at 13:10; A.H. Oosterhoff & W.B. Rayner, Anger and Honsberger Law of Real Property,
vol. 2, 2d ed. (Aurora, Ont.: Canada Law Book, 1985) at 1009; W.B. Rayner & R.H. McLaren,
eds., Falconbridge on Mortgages, 4th ed. (Agincourt, Ont.: Canada Law Book, 1977) at 19; Report
on Landlord and Tenant Law, ibid at 75; D.L. Campbell, "Fixtures and Improvements Including
the Rights of Conditional Vendors and Chattel Mortgagees" in Special Lectures of Law Society
of Upper Canada, The Lease in Modem Business (Toronto: Richard de Boo, 1965) at 45; and H.E.
Manning, "The Canadian Law of Fixtures" [1927] 1 D.L.R. 289, reprinted in 2 Dominion Law
Annotations 1084.
24 Section 1(y).
25 Most commentators agree that three classes of property are contemplated. See, eg., McLaren
I, supra, note 8 at § 6.03[2][b][i]; J.S. Ziegel & B. Geva, Commercial and Consumer Transactions
Cases; Text and Materials (Toronto: Emond-Montgomery, 1981) at 1046. A tripartite division of
property is also contemplated in § 9-313 of the 1962 and 1972 Codes, see Coogan IB, supra,
note 11 at §§ 16.07, 17.09, 17.12[1]; J.J. White & R.S. Summers, Handbook of the Law under
the Unifonn Commercial Code (St Paul: West, 1972) at 925; Kripke, supra, note 11 at 62-64.
But cf Professor Gilmore's interpretation of § 9-313, which would recognize only two classes
of property - realty and personalty: Gilmore, supra, note 11 at 813-14.
26 Supra, note 24.
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suppliers of building materials must seek to protect their security interests
through a mechanic's lien under the Construction Lien Act 27 or a real
estate mortgage. Second, chattels that are used in connection with real
estate but that have not become fixtures under the common law remain
personal property for all legal purposes ('pure personalty'). Such goods
retain their personalty status and security interests in them are governed
by sections of the PPSA other than section 36.28 Third, chattels that by
reason of their close association with realty have become 'fixtures'
according to the common law take on the character of real property
for some legal purposes but retain sufficient character as personal property
to remain or become subject to the PPSA. It is these 'fixtures' to which
the rules of section 36 of the PPSA apply.
One can, therefore, view this third case as a central gray area that
lies on a continuum running from pure personalty to pure realty.29
Consequently, the courts will have to delineate the two lines that bound
the fixture area: on the one side a court must distinguish fixtures from
goods that have become an integral part of the structure (building
materials) so as to become real property, and on the other side of the
continuum it must distinguish fixtures from goods not sufficiently in-
corporated to lose the status of pure personalty.
A. Building Materials Versus Fixtures
Courts and commentators alike have expressed concern that the
line between 'building materials' and 'fixtures' is a hard one to draw. 30
Presumably this is because the tests used by the courts have been
ambiguous and inconsistently applied, resulting in contradictory results.3t
The cases reveal that three general tests, based primarily on principles
that already exist with respect to the law of fixtures, are being used
27 S.O. 1983, c. 6, as am. 1983, c. 77.
28 Eg., the PMSI rule of s. 34(3) and the general priority rules contained in s. 35.
29 White & Summers, supra, note 25 at 925.
30 See Collis v. Carew Lumber Co. (1930), 65 O.L.R. 520 at 525 (C.A.) [hereinafter Cols];
Campbell, supra, note 23 at 58. Similar expressions of concern have also been made by commentators
in the United States. See, eg., Gilmore, supra, note II at 812-14; KJ. Jurek, "Making the ucc's
Fixture Section More Workable" [1971] U. Ill. L.F. 682 at 684.
31 See, eg.,Montreal Trust Co. v. GoldaireRentalsLtd(1966), [1967] 1O.R. 40 (H.C.) [hereinafter
Montreal Trust Co.] and Toronto-Dominion Bank v. A.V. Ventures Ltd (1983), 44 B.C.L.R. 347
(S.C.) ruling that elevators are fixtures, and Huron Fabricators Ltd v. Joseph Walker (14 February
1966), (Ont. S.C.) [unreported] (discussed at length in Montreal Trust Co. at 52-53), Carseallen
Co. Ct. J. holding that elevators are building materials, not fixtures.
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in distinguishing building materials from fixtures: 32 (1) the degree or
relative permanence of the annexation of the chattel to the real estate;
33
(2) whether the chattel was adapted to or customized for the particular
use being made of the real estate;34 and (3) the objective intention of
the parties to make a permanent annexation to the realty.35 An additional
factor is the amount of damage to the basic structure of the building
that would be incurred by removing the object from the realty. This
last factor, however, is generally not considered to be a separate test
but another factor to be used in conjunction with one or more of the
other tests.36
This concern, however, need not persist if the courts are able to
understand and correctly apply the overall purpose and intent of section
36. Although the PPSA does not define the term 'building materials',
37
subsection 36(4) can be used by the courts in conjunction with the
32 See Alexander v. McGillivray (1932), 41 O.W.N. 406 at 408 (H.C.) (quoted and approved
in Charles A. Hare Ltd, supra, note 8 at 97-98) where Assistant Master Lennox stated that in
determining what is a building material "similar principles must be applied as in dealing with
the question of fixtures. The degree and the object of the annexation must be considered. No doubt
the distinction here should not be so finely drawn as in the case of fixtures, but the underlying
principle is the same." But see Montreal Trust Co., ibA at 52 where MacRae Co. Ct. J. questions
this approach.
33 Alexander v. McGillivray, ibid. at 408; Montreal Trust Co., ibid at 55; Charles A. Hare Ltd,
ibid at 99; Leslie & Palmer Co. v. Hydrogrowers Corp., supra, note 8 at 295; Manning, supra, note
8 at 73; Re Patterson (1969), 12 C.B.R. (N.S.) 251 at 253-54 (Ont. S.C.); Agricultural Development
Board v. De Laval Co., Ltd and Brown (1925), 58 O.L.R. 35 at 38 (H.C.).
34 Collis, supra, note 30; Rockett Lumber and Building Supplies Ltd v. Papageoigiou (1979),
30 C.B.R. (N.S.) 183 at 187-88 (Ont. Co. CL) [hereinafter Rockett] (thermos windows constructed
with aluminum frames custom-made for a building and thus could not be used elsewhere unless
disassembled and recycled).
35 Alexander v. McGillivray, supra, note 32 at 408.
36 Montreal Trust Co., supra, note 31 at 48; Cois, supra, note 30; Charles A Hare Ltd, supra,
note 8 at 99; Manning, supra, note 8 at 73.
37 Ontario courts have defined building materials to be "a material which becomes, or is
intended to become, incorporated in a structure as an integral part of the structure": Montreal
Trust Co., ibid at 55. See also Alexander v. McGillivray, supra, note 32 at 408 where Assistant
Master Lennox said that 'building materials' are "integral parts of the whole construction, as compared
with other articles which are mere adjuncts or appendages." Therefore, he continued,
[i]n determining what is building material it is necessary to consider the entire construction.
Certain equipment that by itself would appear to come under the classification of a chattel,
may in the general construction of a building become so closely interlinked and identified
with other materials generally described as building material, that they must for all practical
purposes be considered as building materials, within the meaning of s. 8 [of the Conditional
Sales Act, R.S.O. 1927, c. 165].
See also Rockett, supra, note 34 at 186 and Charles A Hare Ltd, ibid at 99, which applied the
reasoning of Assistant Master Lennox.
Section 1(d) of the Saskatchewan PPSA, supra, note 10, however, defines 'building materials'
using a single test based upon the extent and type of damage caused by severing the goods from
the building.
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common-law tests above to assist in delineating the outer limits of this
category. Section 36(4) provides that when a party with a security interest
in a fixture has priority over the claim of a person having an interest
in the real property, the secured party may on the debtor's default remove
the collateral from the real estate. The secured party, however, must
reimburse the encumbrancer or owner of the real property, other than
the debtor, for the cost of repairing any physical injury to the realty
caused by the removal. It is thought that this cost plus the expense of
removal will deter removal of any goods whose value when removed
would not exceed those costs. Therefore, practical economic consider-
ations would preclude removals that would disrupt the building too much.
Professor Hawldand has explained the relationship between the line
separating 'fixtures' and 'pure realty' and Article 9-313(5), the equivalent
of section 36(4), as follows:
While this class ['fixtures'] is difficult to define metaphysically, the draftsmen thought
they could do it economically by stating that any chattel, except those falling
clearly in [the 'pure realty' class], could be removed by the conditional seller
regardless of material injury to the real estate claimant, if the fixture financer
would reimburse the real estate claimant, other than the debtor, for the damage
to the real property caused by the removal. Bricks incorporated into a building
could not be removed under any circumstance.., but what about an air conditioner
or a furnace? It was thought that considerations of economics would prevent a
conditional seller from effecting removal if these items were so much a part of
the building that the physical damage to the structure would offset the gain of
removal. On the other hand, if this economic situation did not deter remova4 that
was proof positive that an item was really a fixture that could be taken, with
reimbursement for physical damage to the real property, by the chattel financer
against nonprotected realty interests. 38
B. Pure Personalty Versus Fixtures
Another major problem in this area is defining the line that
distinguishes 'pure personalty' from 'fixtures'. It is this line, to which
section 36 in no way addresses itself, that will prove more difficult if
38 W.D. Hawkland, "The Proposed Amendments to Article 9 of the ucc - Part 3: Fixtures"
(1972) 77 Comm. Li. 43 at 45. It appears that some courts have comprehended the scheme and
plan of the fixture section. See, ag., Dry Dock Savings Bank v. De Georgio, (1969), 305 N.Y.S.
2d 73 (Sup. CL), which held that aluminum siding on a house was a fixture and could therefore
be removed by the fixture financer. Although the decision was questionable, the court showed
a clear understanding of § 9-313, the model for s. 36 of the PPSA. In rendering its decision the
court stated (at 75) that
the inquiry made now is different from that made formerly and so is the remedy. First
you must decide whether the security holder's goods are like lumber and bricks. If they
are, he has no lien and that is an end of the matter. If they are not, he has a superior
lien, but not on the proceeds of the sale. He merely has the right to remove the goods
after posting security to repair any damage.
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the relevant pre-PPSA law does not recognize a tripartite division of
property as does the PPSA. In fact, it seems to have been suggested in
some literature that the Anglo-Canadian common-law position on fixtures
does not recognize the PPSA's tripartite division of property.39 Rather,
in these jurisdictions the term 'fixtures' is used to express a legal conclusion
and is not used to describe a special class of property annexed to the
real estate.40 Consequently, such a classification would make it concep-
tually impossible for any interest of a personal property character to
co-exist with real property interests in the same goods. For example,
if a suit arose between a chattel financer and the land mortgagee, the
critical question would be whether the goods had become so affixed
or annexed to the freehold as to become fixtures. If they had, there could
be no chattel interest in the goods, which would have become part of
the freehold, and the validity of the real property claim would be
established. 41 On the other hand, if the court concluded that the goods
were not fixtures, then there could be no real property interest in them
and the validity of the chattel interest would be established.
It has, therefore, been suggested that section 36 will be unworkable
in these jurisdictions because under the PPSA, in contrast to the pre-
39 See, eg., H. Broom, A Selection of Legal Maxims: Classified and Illustrated, 10th ed. by
R.H. Kersley (Philadelphia: T. & J.W. Johnson, 1939) at 262-63, 271; R.D. Niles, "The Rationale
of the Law of Fixtures: English Cases" (1933-34) 11 N.Y.U.L.Q.R. 560 at 561 where the author
stated: "The English view seems to be that the fixture, whether attached by the tenant or the
owner is, while in place, owned by the owner of the land and has the legal characteristics of
real property." See for support of this principle Arg/es v. McMath (1894), 26 O.R. 224 at 226,
aff'd 23 O.A.R. 44; Bain v. Brand (1876), 1 App. Cas. 762 at 772 (H.L.); Alway v. Anderson
(1848), 5 U.C.Q.B. 34 at 41 (C.A.). See also Manning, supra, note 23, but note the discussion
of the rights of conditional vendors at 350-53. See also Oosterhoff & Rayner, supra, note 23,
but note the discussion of the rights of conditional vendors at 1064. For literature that expressly
rejects this conclusion, see McLaren I, supra, note 8 at § 6.03[2][b]; McLaren II, supra, note 8
at 239-40. See also notes 44-53, infra and accompanying text.
40 This view of fixtures was in accordance with the ancient maxim, quicquid plantatur solo,
solo cedit, which means "whatever is affixed to the soil belongs to the soil."
41 Hobson v. Gorringe (1896), [1897] 1 Ch. 182 (C.A.); Reynolds v. Ashby (1904), [1904]
A.C. 466 (H.L.). In harmony with the English position, see Hoppe v. Manners (1931), 66 O.L.R.
587 at 592 where the Court of Appeal said that "[o]nce a chattel is attached to the realty in
such a way as to become a fixture, then it is land and no longer a chattel." See also Seeley v.
Caldwell (1908), 18 O.L.R. 472, 12 O.W.R. 1245 (H.C.). This principle has also been followed
in other Canadian provinces. In Manitoba, see Andrews v. Brown (1909), 19 Man. R. 4 (C.A.)
overruling two earlier decisions, WaterousEngine Works Co. v. Henry (1884), 2 Man. R. 169 (Q.B.)
and The Vulcan Iron Works Co. v. The Rapid City Farmers' Elevator Co. (1894), 9 Man. R. 577
(Full Court), which upheld the rights of conditional vendors to remove their fixtures. In Saskatchewan,
see Cockhutt Plow Co. v. McLoughry (1909), 2 Sask. L.R. 259 (S.C.); Berlin Interior Hardwood
Co. v. Colonial Investment and Loan Co. (1918), 38 D.L.R. 643 (S.C.). In Alberta, see D'Augigney
v. Brunswick-Balke Collender Co. (1917), [1917] 1 W.W.R. 1331 (S.C.). In British Columbia, see
Haywood & Dodds v. Lim Bang (1914), 17 D.L.R. 760 (C.A.); Welch v. General Refrigeration Ltd
(1929), [1930] 2 D.L.R. 672 (S.C.). In New Brunswick, see Harrison v. Nespisquit Lumber Co.
(1911),41 N.B.R. 1 (S.C.).
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PPSA common-law position, a court must recognize the possibility of
conflicting real and personal property interests in the same goods and
resolve the conflicts by way of the priority rules in section 36. The practical
implication of this is that lawyers and courts in such jurisdictions will
get only limited guidance from pre-PPSA cases.42 While the pre-Act law
may be useful in classifying the collateral as pure personalty or as pure
realty, it will not be precise enough to help in distinguishing between
a collateral that is pure personalty and one having both real and personal
property characteristics. 43
However, there are a number of reasons that lead the author to
believe that the situation is not all that bad. In Ontario and in most
other Canadian jurisdictions, the common-law position has been modified
significantly by conditional sales legislation or more recently by personal
property security legislation.44 By the Conditional Sales Acts or similar
legislation of most of the jurisdictions, the seller retains rights in the
goods (excluding building materials) even though they have become
affixed to the realty. However, the owner of the realty, or any purchaser,
mortgagee, or other encumbrancer, is given the right, as against the seller,
42 Many American commentators have made similar remarks about the relevance of pre-
1962 Code cases. See, eg., Coogan IB, supra, note 11 at §§ 16.06, 17.09, 17.13, 17.14; C.D.
Berry, "Priority Conflicts Between Fixture Secured Creditors and Real Estate Claimants" (1976-77)
7 Mem. St. U.L. Rev. 209 at 225-26; Adams, supra, note 7 at 838-41; Gilmore, supra, note 8
at 1395; but cf Gilmore, supra, note 11 at 815 where upon further reflection the author did an
about face.
43 For instance, one who finances bowling alleys should not rely on a case like Re Davis
(1953), [1954] O.W.N. 187 at 190 (H.C.), which held that a bowling alley was personal property.
Yet the financer could under the PPsA rely on that case for the holding that a bowling alley is
at least not realty. Similarly, a case like Andrews v. Brown, supra, note 41, which held that furnaces
are realty, should not cause a financer to be reluctant to hold a security interest in furnaces as
fixtures. Assuming that neither the bowling alley nor the furnace is classified as building material,
both should be fixtures under the PPSA. See, eg., Collis, supra, note 30, where the Ontario Court
of Appeal held that a furnace was a fixture for the purposes of the Conditional Sales Act, R.S.O.
1927, c. 165, s. 2(3), which implicitly recognized a tripartite division of property when a conditional
seller was involved. See also notes 52 & 53, infra and accompanying text; Manning, supra, note
8, where Monnin CJ.M. for the majority stated in obiter (at 73-74) that the gas water heater
and furnace were fixtures but that the ducts, bonnets, eavestroughing, and gas pipes had become
so incorporated into the dwelling that they had become building materials and were outside the
scope of s. 36 of the Manitoba PPSA. Contra in a separate and concurring judgment, O'Sullivan
J.A. stated in obiter (at 78):
There are many types of fixtures and special laws regarding some of them. But I have
no doubt that in this country a furnace and water heater are regarded as part of a house
which on a transfer passes under a Torrens transfer. I have no doubt that under the Torrens
system a furnace and a water heater intended to be installed on a permanent basis is part
of the land within the meaning of the [Real Property] Act.
44 Supra, note 10.
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to retain the goods upon payment of the amount owing on them.45 This
exception to the general approach with respect to fixtures is premised
on the absence of any reliance interest on the part of the real estate
interest. For example, if the fixture party is permitted to retrieve the
fixture, the security of the realty interest will not be diminished. Conversely,
if the fixture financer does not prevail, then the real estate interest will
be unjustly enriched. In other words, because the fixture financers (usually
purchase money creditors) add new value to the real estate, their
credentials have evoked extensive protection in Ontario and in other
jurisdictions. 46
Therefore, because the initial common-law position on fixtures has
been subject to constant modifications in light of changing social and
economic conditions, three views are possible in those jurisdictions having
similar conditional sales legislation.47 First, the general rule is still that
45 At one time, there were seven jurisdictions that had enacted legislation containing this
special provision in respect of goods affixed to the realty. Subsequently, four jurisdictions have
replaced their conditional sales legislation with personal property security legislation, ibid The other
three provinces are British Columbia (R.S.B.C. 1979, c. 373, ss 11(2), 16), New Brunswick (R.S.N.B.
1973, c. C- 15, s. 17), and Newfoundland (R.S.N. 1970, c. 56, s. 14). The four common-lawjurisdictions
that do not contain a similar provision with respect to goods affixed to the real estate in their
conditional sales legislation (Le., conditional sellers have only to register their agreement under
the appropriate conditional sales register and not under any land registry system in order to maintain
their rights against subsequent interests in the land) include Alberta (R.S.A. 1980, c. C-21), Nova
Scotia (R.S.N.S. 1967, c. 48), Prince Edward Island (R.S.P.E.I. 1974, c. C-16), and Northwest
Territories (RO.N.W.T. 1974, c. C-9, as am. 1980 (2d Sess.), c. 7). For a discussion of the relevant
provisions with respect to fixtures in the conditional sales legislation currently in place in Canada,
see Oosterhoff & Rayner, supra, note 23 at 1064-67.
46 In fact, the early common-law position in Ontario generally upheld the rights of conditional
vendors to remove their fixtures. See, ag., Joseph Hall Manufacturing Co. v. Hazlitt (1886), 11
O.A.R 749 at 751, 753, affg 8 O.R. 465 [hereinafter Joseph Hall]; Stevens v. Barfoot (1885),
13 O.A.R. 366 at 373; and Poison v. Degeer (1886), 12 O.R. 275 at 280 (C.A.), where all three
courts recognized and approved a similar principle that "the affixing of the property of a stranger
to the freehold of another did not operate to deprive the stranger of his right to the property
when it could be removed without serious damage to the freehold" (Poison v. Degeer, ibid. at 280).
See also Thomas v. Inglis (1885), 7 O.R. 588 (CI. D.). But cf McDonald v. Weeks (1860), 8 Gr.
297 (Ont.). After the English Court of Appeal decided against the chattel interests in Hobson v.
Gorringe, supra, note 41, it was feared that the previous case law favouring the conditional seller
would be reversed. Consequently, Ontario adopted legislation that gave the conditional seller some
protection against real estate interests (see S.O. 1897, 60 Vict., c. 14, s. 80). That provision was
further developed over the years - often in response to decisions like Hoppe v. Manners, supra,
note 41, which were clearly contrary to the history and plain intent of the legislation - and became,
until its repeal, s. 10 of the'Conditional Sales Act, supra, note 4.
It is also important to note that these Ontario cases have never been expressly overruled. Accord
E.C. Fetzer, "The Ontario Conditional Sales Act: What are the rights of an unpaid seller, whose
chattels have been affixed to realty" (1939) 17 Can. B. Rev. 583 at 584. But cf J.S. Ziegel, The
Canadian Law of Conditional Sales and Hire-Purchase, vol. 2 (Ph.D., University of London,
1962)[unpublished] at 519 n. 154, where the author suggests that "their authority has been much
weakened" by Haggart v. The Town of Brampton (1897), 28 S.C.R1 174 (an appeal from Ontario)
where the objective test of intention was affirmed and by numerous subsequent lower court decisions
that appear to have assumed that the English position as enunciated in Hobson v. Gorringe, ibid,
represents the common law position in Ontario.
47 McLaren I, supra, note 8, at § 6.03[2][b].
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whatever is fixed to the freehold becomes part of it and is not capable
of removal. Second, 'removable fixtures' such as 'trade fixtures' and
'tenants' fixtures' are one exception to the general rule. They are annexed
to the land for the purposes of trade, domestic convenience, or orna-
mentation in so permanent a manner as to become part of the land,48
but the tenants who erected them are entitled to remove them during
the term of the tenancy49 or after its expiration if they remain in possession
under circumstances that entitle them to consider themselves as tenants,50
provided that the removal of the fixtures will not cause substantial damage
to the freehold.51 Third, chattels sold by conditional sellers who have
complied with the Conditional Sales Act are a second exception. Despite
affixation to the real estate, these chattels retain their discrete character
so that the conditional seller can prevail over the real estate interests. 52
It would therefore appear that, in certain circumstances, a tripartite division
of property is recognized. Accordingly, courts in these jurisdictions should
have little trouble in adjusting to personal property security legislation
that simply deals with secured parties generally.53
48 Bain v. Brand, supra, note 39 at 770; Holland v. Hodgson (1872), L.R. 7 C.P. 328 at
333; Re De Falbe (1900), [1901] 1 Ch. 523 at 535, af'd (sub nom. Leigh v. Taylor) (1902), [1902]
A.C. 157 (H.L.). See also Manning, supra, note 23 at 321-23; Rhodes, supra, note 23 at s. 13:3
and the cases cited therein.
49 Veterans Manufacturing and Supply Co. v. Harris (1920), 19 O.W.N. 226 (C.A.). See also
Oosterhoff & Rayner, supra, note 23 at 1049 and the cases cited therein.
50 Cameron v. Hunter (1873), 34 U.C.Q.B. 121 at 125 (C.A.). See also Oosterhoff & Rayner,
ibid at 1050 and cases cited therein.
51 Cartwright v. Herring (1904), 3 O.W.R. 511 at 512 (Trial Ct.); Hughes v. Towers (1865),
16 U.C.C.P. 287 at 296; Liscombe Falls Gold Mining Co. v. Bishop (1905), 35 S.C.R. 539. See
also Rhodes, supra, note 23 at s. 13:3:2 and cases cited therein.
52 See, ag., Collis, supra, note 30 at 524 where Mr. Justice Middleton held that
when a chattel has become a fixture, the section of the [Conditional Saks] Act governing
the rights of the parties is s. 8, and, assuming in other respects a valid conditional sale,
the purchaser of the land is given the right to retain the fixture upon payment of the amount
due. Otherwise, upon the occurrence of default, the seller may remove the fixture as fully
and freely as if it had never been affixed to the land.
See also Murphy Wall Bed Co. of Detroit v. Levin (1925), 57 O.L.R. 105 at 108 (C.A.) [hereinafter
Murphy Wall Bed Co.] (vendor has a right to remove beds affixed to a building that could be
removed without causing injury to the building), where Ferguson J.A. referred to fixtures as meaning
"something affixed as an accessory to the house rather than to something which forms part of
the structure or house itself." See also Goldie & McCulloch Co. v. Town of Uxbridge (1909), 13
O.W.R. 969 (S.C.) (machinery sold under conditional sales agreement, vendor entitled to enforce
rights under the agreement notwithstanding the fact that the machinery was affixed to the realty
and that the realty would be damaged by its removal). For more recent cases, see Pape v. Edfield
Holdings Ltd (1967), [1968] 1 O.R. 369 at 372 (S.C.O. Master's Chambers); Montreal Trust Co.,
supra, note 31; Plaza Equities Ltd v. Bank of Nova Scotia (1978), 84 D.L.R. (3d) 609 (Alta. S.C.T.D.)
[hereinafter Plaza Equities Ltd]; and Stage Inns (Cranbrook) Ltd v. Standard Metal Products Ltd
(1977), 5 B.C.L.R. 140 (S.C.), aff'd (1978), 17 B.C.L.R. 1 (C.A.), leave to appeal to S.C.C. refused
[1979] 1 S.C.R. xiii.
53 See Cormier, supra, note 8 at 170.
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Even in those jurisdictions where the prior law would not be based
on this classification,54 it does not follow that a fixture provision like
section 36 will be impotent. The problem in these jurisdictions might
be resolved by construing such a provision in the context of the general
law of fixtures. The rights of third parties not having an interest in the
land (for example, conditional sellers) are but one of the many specific
problems dealt with in fixture cases.55 A fixture section in personal property
security legislation deals only with the problem of priorities. It would
therefore be reasonable to assume that the fixture section supercedes
the general law of fixtures only with respect to priorities and leaves
the rest unchanged.56 In other words, the courts should deal with the
classification problem by relying on the common law; the priority problem
can be determined by applying the fixture section in the personal property
security legislation. Such a reading parallels the Canadian courts' position
toward their respective conditional sales legislation; such legislation had
no effect on the law of fixtures outside of the priority area but fun-
damentally altered the law in that area.57
There would, however, seem to be a serious problem with this
approach. As stated earlier,s8 in cases dealing with the rights of conditional
vendors and other third parties, the concept of fixtures as a separate
and distinct class of property is vigorously denied in these provinces;
the term 'fixtures' is used simply to express a legal conclusion. Although
the reasoning in the cases appears to involve a two-step process - first
classifying and then deciding the victor - in reality classification and
decision are one process. Because the courts in these provinces usually
54 See note 45, supra, for those jurisdictions which seem to have only a two-category classification
of property; that is, the question of whether the chattel has become a fixture is immaterial to
the determination of the rights of the competing parties.
55 Fixture law problems can be divided into four major categories: (1) owners of the fixtures
install them on their realty and transfer or mortgage the realty; (2) owners of the fixtures annex
them to someone else's realty in which they have some interest as, for example, tenants or licensees,
giving rise to problems involving trade or tenants' fixtures; (3) third parties not having an interest
in the land own the fixture or have a security interest in the fixture - the classic fixture priority
problem; and (4) cases involving claims for insurance, assessment matters, and the like. CfManning,
supra, note 23 at 301.
56 Gordon, supra, note 12 at 664.
57 See, eg., Crane v. Hoffman (1916), 27 D.L.R. 592 at 597 (Ont. C.A.), Garrow J.A.; Plaza
Equities Ltd, supra, note 52 at 634, where McDonald J. said that "[e]ven if the mobile home were
a fixture at common law, so that the mortgagee of the land would have become entitled to it,
the Conditional Sales Act may have the effect of altering the situation." See also a similar approach
taken by American courts from minority rule states (that is, states that recognized only two types
of property - personalty and realty) when s.7 of the Uniform Conditional Sales Act, the predecessor
to the 1962 Code, came into effect. For example, in People's Saving & Trust Co. v. Munsert (1933),
212 Wis. 449 at 453, the court said that the priority dispute is "not ruled by the law of fixtures
but by the law of conditional sales contracts and consequently the well-established common law
applicable to fixtures has little to do with this controversy."
58 See text accompanying note 40, supra.
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prefer the real estate interest, they classify the conditional vendor's chattel,
which has been annexed to the land, as real estate.
Therefore, a search of such cases is necessarily circular and worthless
in assisting the courts to solve the classification problem. Moreover, it
gives no effect to the purpose of a fixture section: to protect the rights
of conditional sellers and other secured parties as against persons with
an interest in the real estate.
Obviously, such a state of affairs must be avoided. Since the
classification of objects as removable or irremovable fixtures is not
necessarily the same under the various branches of fixture law,59 courts
should, in dealing with the classification problem, avail themselves of
a branch of fixture law that best gives effect to the fixture section. The
branch that determines whether the fixture would pass to a purchaser,
grantee, or mortgagee of the real estate in the absence of an express
provision in the deed, grant, or mortgage would appear to be the most
desirable choice.60
Accordingly, before deciding the priority issue, the courts should
search for cases under this branch of fixture law in order to resolve
the classification issue. If the investigation determines that the alleged
fixture would not pass to the mortgagee or purchaser, the fixture section
would not be applied because the common law has indicated that the
59 In cases arising between tenant and landlord, the courts have generally held that the objects
at issue are removable by the tenant: Clark v. Brager, supra, note 21 (electrical lighting, elevator,
and hot air furnaces); Howell v. The Listowell Rink and Park Company (1887), 13 O.R. 476 at
491-92 (C.A.) (hardwood floor laid down for roller skating); Dundas v. Osment (1907), 6 W.L.R.
86 at 88 (N.W.T.C.A.) (stair pads and dictum with respect to ordinary carpet tacked down to
prevent it from slipping); Arg/es v. McMath, supra, note 39 (awnings, shelving, inner office, mirror,
gas fixtures, and brass windows); Devine v. Callery (1917), 40 O.L.R. 505 (C.A.) (wooden house);
Blower and Sedens v. Workers' Compensation Board (1983), 50 A.R. 66 (Q.B.) (crane with two-
ton lifting capacity on a runway system bolted to the ceiling and floor of the building); New Zealand
Government Property Corporation v. H.M & S. Ltd (1982), [1982] Q.B. 1145 (C.A.) (theatre seats).
In contrast, when the dispute is between a grantor and grantee, mortgagor and mortgagee, or vendor
and purchaser, the courts have held the same object or substantially similar objects to be realty
and thus not removable: Stack v. T Eaton Co. (1902), 4 O.L.R. 335 (C.A.) (gas and electric light
chandeliers and shelving); Fess Oil Burners Ltd v. Mutual Investments Ltd (1932), [1932] O.R. 203
(C.A.) (oil burner to heat premises); LaSalle Recreations, supra, note 23 (carpets with rubber
undercushions held in place with hooks); Dorey v. Gray (1906), 42 N.S.R. 259 (C.A.) (storm windows
and storm doors); Ground Engineering Ltd v. Agra Industries Limited B.B. Torchinsky & Associates
Ltd and The H.A. Roberts Group Ltd (1977), [1977] 6 W.W.R. 598 (Sask. Q.B.) (shelving, cupboards,
counters, bookcases, a drying oven, an exhaust fan, and drapery rods); Miles v. Ankatell (1898),
25 O.A.R. 458 (C.A.) (a small wooden building); LeBlanc v. Farm Credit Corp. of Canada (1985),
64 N.B.R. (2d) 337 (Q.B.) (silos); Lahey v. Queenston Quarry Co. Limited (1916), 11 O.W.N. 18
(H.C.), aff'd II O.W.N. 120 (C.A.) (a derrick in a gravel pit); Vaudeville Electric Cinemta Ltd v.
Muriset (1922), [1923] 2 Ch. 74 (theatre seats).
60 The only other two possibilities are the last two branches referred to in note 55, supra.
They deal with trade or tenants' fixtures, and the taxation and insuring of fixtures, respectively.
Both are unsatisfactory alternatives. Trade or tenants' fixtures are often viewed as exceptions to
the general principles of fixture law (see notes 154 to 157, infra and accompanying text). With
respect to the last branch, not only are there fewer cases but often these decisions are based on
statutory definitions of the term 'fixtures'.
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alleged fixture is pure personalty; that is, real estate interests should not
regard themselves as having any expectation interest in the fixture. On
the other hand, if the common law determines that the fixtures would
pass to the mortgagee or purchaser automatically as part of the real
estate, then these real estate parties have an expectation interest that
must be accounted for if a fixture financer's security interest exists. At
this point, the priority rules in the fixture section are triggered in order
to resolve the dispute between the competing parties.
Although the cases tend to label fixtures as real estate, including
in this term both fixtures and building materials, the label is of little
importance. It is usually apparent from the facts of the case which line
the court is trying to delineate: pure personalty from fixtures or fixtures
from building materials. If a court knows that the sole issue being decided
is whether the chattel is pure personalty or a fixture, then it is not concerned
with the fixture's ultimate classification under the common law. All a
court needs to know before applying the priority rules in the fixture
section is whether the person holding the interest in the real estate has
an expectation interest in the article that is alleged to have become a
fixture. 6'
C. Summary
Even though the term 'fixtures' is not defined in the PPSA, the Act
does envision a tripartite classification of property with an intermediate
class, fixtures, being bounded by pure realty on one side and pure
personalty on the other. With respect to separating pure realty from
fixtures, practical economic considerations, the common-law tests that
61 In determining whether a given chattel has or has not become a fixture, courts have generally
looked at the degree of annexation (i, the nature of the article and the mode of the annexation)
and the object of the annexation (ie, the circumstances under which it was annexed, the purpose
to be served, and the position of the rival claimants to the articles in dispute) (see, eg., Reynolds
v. Ashby, supra, note 41 at 474; Holland v. Hodgson (1982), L.R. 7 C.P. 328 at 334, Lord Blackburn;
Haggert v. The Town of Brampton, supra, note 46 at 180). The courts rarely speak of the mortgagee's
or purchaser's expectation interest but these tests are in reality indicators of their expectation interest.
As Mr. Justice Stevenson correctly noted in Amic Mortgage Investment Corp. v. Investors Group
Trust Co. Ltd (1985), 37 R.P.R. 56 at 60 (Alta. C.A.):
the objective determination of what is and is not a fixture accords with commercial reality.
Holland v. Hodgson depends not on agreement but on objectively determined intention. The
purchaser of land, a mortgagee of land, a proposed mortgagee or purchaser of chattels
may be expected [emphasis added] to rely on appearances, a factor reflected in Lord Blackburn's
remark [at 335] "... if the intention is apparent [emphasis in original] to make the articles
part of the land, they do become part of the land. ... "
Moreover, with the recent trend in Anglo-Canadian fixture law toward emphasizing the purpose
of the annexation rather than the degree of annexation (see, eg., LaSalle Recreations, supra, note
23; Bank of Nova Scotia v. Mitz (1979), 27 O.R. (2d) 250 (C.A.) (portable horse stalls that formed
a barn were fixtures); Hamp v. Bygrave (1983), 266 E.G. 720 (Q.B.) (garden ornaments such as
patio lights, stone urns, a stone statue, a stone ornament of Chinese origin, and a lead trough
all found to be fixtures)), one can expect that decisions will be more consistent with a purchaser's
or mortgagee's expectation interest than has been the case in the past.
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already exist, and common sense should aid the courts in determining
whether a chattel has become so incorporated into a structure as to have
become building materials. With respect to distinguishing pure personalty
from fixtures, most provinces have a statute that recognizes the PPSA's
classification of property in respect of the conditional seller. Thus, courts
in these jurisdictions should have little difficulty in adjusting to the
introduction of a fixture section. In those provinces where the PPSA's
classification is unfamiliar, another branch of the general law of fixtures
can be used to solve the classification problem. If a priority problem
should then arise, a court could apply the priority rules in the fixture
section.
III. THE PERFECTION AND REAL ESTATE NOTIFICATION
RULES
A. How to Register a Security Interest in Fixtures
Although the drafting is not as clear as one would like, the PPSA
contemplates a uniform set of rules of perfection for security interests
in all types of collateral and a second rule for additional fixture protection.62
62 The drafting permits one to argue that the Act provides for mutually exclusive filings by
creating one rule for security interests in goods and another for security interests in fixtures. Such
an assertion is possible because s. 21 provides that a security interest is perfected when it has
attached and all steps required for perfection have been completed. Perfection can be obtained
by possession (s. 24) or by registering a financing statement in the prescribed form (ss 25 & 47(1)).
(A third method of automatic but temporary perfection also exists but it does not apply to fixtures:
s. 26.) Yet neither s. 24 nor s. 25 expressly includes fixtures in its list of collaterals. Only s. 54(1)
explicitly refers to the registration of a security interest in fixtures. Accordingly, by filing a notice
under s. 54, a fixture-secured party would perfect its interest in the fixtures.
There are, however, serious flaws in this reasoning. First, although ss 24 & 25 do not explicitly
provide for the perfection of a security interest in the fixtures, they do state that possession or
registration perfects a security interest in goods (ss 24(b) & 25(l)(b)). The definition of "goods"
in s. 1(k) does not expressly refer to fixtures. Section 36(2), however, does refer to a "security
interest that attaches to goods after they became fixtures." From this section, it is apparent that
fixtures are part of the term "goods.' Second, the wording in s. 54 does not state that registration
of the notice perfects the security interest in the fixture; it merely constitutes actual notice of the
security interest for the purposes of s. 36(3). Third, one commentator has suggested that registration
is the residuary method of perfection for all types of collateral not specifically provided for in
ss 24 or 26 (A.S. Abel, "Creation of a Security Interest with respect to Third Parties" in Law
Society of Upper Canada, Proceedings of a Program on the Personal Property Security Act as cited
in McLaren I, supra, note 8 at § 3.04). Therefore, if secured parties fail to perfect their fixture
security interests, their interests will be subordinated to other secured parties having competing
claims in the goods, as well as the persons described in s. 22.
This 'mutually exclusive filing' argument is not possible in the other PPSA jurisdictions (see
McLaren I, supra, note 8 at §§ 20.08, 20.13 for a description of the rules as they pertain to the
registration of fixtures in Manitoba, Saskatchewan, and the Yukon Territory) and will not be possible
once the 1985 Draft Act, supra, note 15 is passed. The 1985 Draft Act eliminates the ambiguity
by explicitly setting out a way of perfecting a security interest in fixtures. Fixtures are included
in the definitions of both "goods" and "personal property." Therefore, a fixture security interest
can be perfected by possession (s. 22(b) of the 1985 Draft Act) or by registration (s. 23 of the
1985 Draft Act).
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A virtue of this scheme is that it separates the problem of perfection
from the problem of priorities.63 Fixture-secured parties must file a
financing statement in the prescribed form in order to perfect their security
interest in the fixtures.64 Perfection protects a fixture financer's security
interest against judgment creditors, a trustee in bankruptcy, and certain
transferees for value.65 No real estate filing is required for perfection
but a real estate filing or notification under section 54(1)(a) is necessary
as a condition of priority.66 That is, if the fixture-secured party desires
additional protection against the claims of subsequent real estate interests,
then a second filing of a notice of the security interest in the proper
land registry office is required.67
Therefore, for those secured parties who are not worried about
conflicts with holders of subsequent interests in the real estate,68 the
registration of a financing statement under section 47(1) should provide
sufficient protection against the various parties in section 22. This is
63 The 1962 Code, in contrast, did not separate the problem of perfection from the problem
of priorities. Instead, mutually exclusive methods for perfecting security interests in fixtures and
in other collaterals were established. Commentators in the United States have criticized this system
of registration because it places secured parties in the unenviable position of having to determine
whether the goods are "fixtures ... [or] ... may become fixtures." The decision is not always
easy because, like fixture law in Canada, the law of fixtures in the United States is a "tangled
web." Consequently, fixture financers must either 'guess' as to the appropriate place of filing based
on how they think a court will ultimately classify the collateral or file in all possible places. The
reason for these precautions is that improper filing may cause fixture financers to lose most of
their priorities or even render their security interests worthless in the event of the debtor's bankruptcy.
For a more detailed discussion of this problem and possible solutions to it, see Gilmore, supra,
note 11 at 818-21, 834-36; Kripke, supra, note 11 at 55-57.
The 1972 Code alleviates the secured party's dilemma by removing some of the filing problems
in the 1962 Code, but introduces new grounds for criticism. See Adams, supra, note 7 at 903-
4, 910-13.
64 Section 47(1). When the financing statement is filed under s. 47(1) of the Act, the financer
need not indicate on the statement that the interest is or may become a fixture. If, however, fixture-
secured parties want to record such information, then they can indicate on lines 13 to 15 of the
financing statement that a fixture interest may arise. This is permitted by virtue of s. 3(3) of the
PPSA Regulations, R.R.O. 1980, Reg. 749.
65 Section 22. But see McLaren II, supra, note 8 at 266, where he suggests that a holder
of an unperfected fixture security interest should prevail over a trustee in bankruptcy, despite the
rule in s. 22(1)(a)(iii) because of the priority rule in s. 36. Professor McLaren's argument is examined
later in this paper, see text accompanying notes 80 to 85, infra.
66 Accord Pers-Real Report, supra, note 9 at 18. This scheme is also consistent with many
situations in which a security interest, although perfected (and therefore good against s. 22 interests)
may nevertheless be subordinated to other interests. For example, the additional requirements of
s. 34(2), a PMSI in inventory, are conditions of priority that have nothing whatsoever to do with
perfecting the security interests in inventory.
67 A real estate filing or notification is clearly optional as evident from the wording of s. 54(1)(a).
The relevant portions of that section read as follows: "A notice in the prescribed form may be
registered in the proper land registry office, where, the collateral is or includes fixtures or goods
that may become fixtures ... " [emphasis added].
68 For example, if the fixture-secured parties believe that rising land values will ensure that
the building and the fixtures together have or will have in the future sufficient value to cover
all the debts, then they may feel that there is no need to file a real estate notice.
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important since the acid test of any security interest is its invulnerability
to attacks by the trustee in bankruptcy or by judgment creditors of the
debtor.69
The secured party is not, however, protected against a subsequent
judgment creditor who files an execution against the real estate. Section
36(3)(b) provides that a fixture security interest is not good against
creditors with liens on the real estate subsequently obtained by judicial
proceedings unless real estate notification has occurred.70 It is difficult
to explain why these particular creditors are protected.71 They are not
usually thought of as being "reliance" creditors.72 As well, the subsection
produces an anomalous result. It gives more protection to an unsecured
creditor than to a mortgagee when both the unsecured claim and the
mortgage antedate the creation of the fixture security interest.73 Pre-
sumably because there is no good reason for giving greater protection
to these lien creditors, the Advisory Committee has recommended that
this subsection be deleted when the Act is revised.74
What protection does the real estate filing afford in the converse
situation, when the fixture-secured party does not have a perfected security
interest but has filed a notice of the security interest in the proper land
registry office? As against real estate interests, a real estate filing should
be effective. The PPSA attempts to provide a comprehensive system of
rules to resolve conflicts between competing parties. Section 22 represents
one set of rules that defines the consequences to secured parties of holding
an unperfected security interest. The lack of perfection, however, does
69 Coogan 1, supra, note 8 at § 3A.02[6].
70 Section 36(3)(b) provides the following:
The security interest [sic] referred to in subsections (1) and (2) are subordinate to the interest
of... a creditor with a lien on the real property subsequently obtained as a result of judicial
process ... if... the lien was obtained ... without actual notice of the security interest.
A major interpretive problem posed by this section involves the time reference of the word
"subsequently." The meaning of "subsequent" is considered later in this paper, see text accompanying
notes 103 to I11, infra. Suffice it to say, a "lien ... subsequently obtained" should be read as
referring to the time the goods become fixtures. Accord Gilmore, supra, note I 1 at 827.
71 American commentators also find it difficult to account for the protection afforded such
creditors in the 1962 Code:. Gilmore, ibid at 826-27; Kripke, supra, note I 1 at 59, where he describes
§ 9-313(4)(b) as being "unnecessary and unwise"; Adams, supra, note 7 at 849-50.
72 Kripke, ibid at 59.
73 For example, unsecured creditors who reduce their claim to judgment and acquire a judicial
lien against the real estate before a fixture financer files a real estate notice prevail over even
a perfected fixture security interest. Conversely, land mortgagees lose to subsequent fixture interests
even if the latter have never perfected their security interest. See Gilmore, supra, note 11 at 826;
Adams, supra, note 7 at 850 n. 53.
74 See the Advisory Committee's commentary to this change in the 1984 Draft Act, supra,
note 15 at 10, 54-55.
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not affect the validity of the agreement;75 it simply reduces the bundle
of priority rights that exist independently of the perfection requirements
and upon which a party with an unperfected interest can rely.76 Section
36 is an example of a priority rule in which perfection is not a prerequisite.
Thus, an unperfected security interest in a fixture is good against prior
real estate interests.77 Furthermore, as stated earlier,78 a real estate filing
is not a step towards perfection but rather a condition of priority.
Accordingly, there is no reason to require a security interest to be perfected
as a prerequisite to the operation of the rules that give fixture security
interests priority over real estate interests when there has been a real
estate filing under section 54(1).
Will a real estate filing alone be effective against a trustee in
bankruptcy and the other persons listed in section 22? Most commentators
conclude that a fixture-secured party's interest would not be good against
the trustee in bankruptcy and the other persons who can take advantage
of non-perfection.79 Such a conclusion seems convincing given that a
real estate notification is a condition of priority and not of perfection.
Professor McLaren, on the other hand, argues that notwithstanding
section 22(1)(a)(iii), a fixture-secured party should, by virtue of the special
priority rule in section 36, defeat a trustee in bankruptcy of a debtor
who owns only real property.80 This position, however, appears contrary
75 Under the PPSA, a security interest is valid so long as the secured party has complied with
all of the s. 10 formalities necessary for enforceability. In contrast, prior to the PPSA, a failure
to have registered under the Conditional Sales Act, supra, note 4, s. 2(1), as am. S.O. 1972, c. 23,
s. 1 (1) or under the Bills of Sale and Chattel Mortgages Act, supra, note 4, s. 8 caused the transactions
to become invalid.
76 See Kripke, supra, note I 1 at 59, where he states that
while perfection or nonperfection is based on one set of rules and consequences stated or
implied in Section 9-301 of the Code [comparable to s. 22 of the PPsA], there are independently
various priority rules [emphasis in original], some of which apply between perfected interests
and some of which apply between a perfected security interest and another kind of interest
such as that of a buyer of chattels or real estate, an encumbrancer of real estate, or a
non-contractual lien claimant. Section 9-313 [s. 36 of the PPSA] contains a set of priority
rules of the latter type.
Accord McLaren II, supra, note 8 at 266.
77 Section 36(1). Another such example is s. 37(1), where an unperfected security interest
in an accession subordinates a prior interest in respect of the whole.
78 See text accompanying notes 66 & 67, supra.
79 See, ag., Kripke, supra, note 11 at 59, where he explains how the above priority problem
would be resolved under a registration system very much like the one currently in place in Ontario.
See also Pers-Real Report, supra, note 9 at 20.
80 McLaren II, supra, note 8 at 266. In his article, Professor McLaren appears to assert that
a trustee in bankruptcy would lose whenever a fixture secured party holds a pre-affixation security
interest. In a telephone conversation on March 6, 1986, he explained that his proposition was
limited to those instances where the debtor owned only real property. In other words, he stated
that an unperfected security interest in fixtures would not be good against the attacks of a trustee
in bankruptcy if the debtor also owned personal property.
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to the history and plain intent of this section and of a similar provision
in the Conditional Sales Act that was enacted to statutorily protect a
conditional seller from the courts' apparent willingness to disregard a
vendor's interest in favour of third parties with an interest in the real
estate, such as a land mortgagee.8' It was never intended that the section's
priority rule should be used against the trustee in bankruptcy. Unlike
a land mortgagee who gains title to the fixtures in the capacity of a
holder with an interest in the real estate, the trustee in bankruptcy gains
only the debtor's interest in the fixtures.82
Second, the PPSA contemplates that only by filing a financing
statement can a secured party protect its interest in a fixture from the
attacks of the trustee in bankruptcy as well as the other parties listed
in section 22.83 Using section 36 to defeat the claims of a trustee in
bankruptcy would simply cast aside what has been described by Professor
McLaren as a fundamental policy of the PPSA; that is, "to encourage
registration and perfection."84
Furthermore, Professor McLaren's reason for not giving priority to
trustees in bankruptcy over fixture-secured parties is not totally convincing.
He believes that if trustees are able to claim priority before the fixtures
are removed they will not be able to exercise the fixture-secured parties'
rights of removal or be able to force them to exercise their rights. As
a result, parties with a real estate interest will enjoy a windfall gain
because most fixture-secured parties, when faced with this situation, will
simply abandon their claims and never exercise their rights of removal. 85
While this may be true, giving priority to fixture financers in this situation
would in a sense provide a windfall gain to unperfected fixture-secured
creditors who knew or ought to have known that an unperfected security
interest would not protect them against those parties listed in section
22.
Therefore, a real estate filing should not protect the fixture-secured
party's interest against the claims of those parties in section 22 who
81 See notes 44-46, supra and accompanying text.
82 See Re Oto Grundman Implements Ltd (1969), 9 D.L.R.(3d) 206 at 209 (Man. C.A.) where
Mr. Justice Freedman held that "[a] trustee in bankruptcy stands in the shoes of the bankrupt,
except where statutory provisions otherwise decree"; Re Bellini Manufacturing and Importing Ltd
(1981), 1 P.P.S.A.C. 259 at 266 (Ont. C.A.). See also L. Duncan & J.S. Honsberger, Bankruptcy
in Canada, 3d ed. (Toronto: Canadian Legal Authors, 1961) at 93-94, 285 and cases cited therein;
L. W. Houlden & C.H. Morawetz, Bankruptcy Law of Canada, vol. 1 (Toronto: Carswell, loose-
leaf, Release No. 22, June 1986) at F § 1 and cases cited therein.
83 See text accompanying notes 62 to 65, supra.
84 McLaren , supra, note 8 at § 6.02[2][a][iii].
85 McLaren 11, supra, note 8 at 266.
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can take advantage of nonperfection. If none of these parties are present
in the dispute, then there is no reason for requiring perfection as a
prerequisite to applying the rules in section 36 in favour of the fixture-
secured party as against all real estate interests when a real estate notice
has been properly filed.
B. Formal Requirements for Perfection and Real Estate Notification" The
Secured Party's Practical Difficulties
Although the system of registration for fixtures generally works well,
the current rules do contain a number of uncertainties threatening not
only the naive and unsuspecting creditor but also the more sophisticated
lending institution. Before fixture-secured parties can take advantage of
a perfected security interest or a notice filed in the proper land registry
office, they must satisfy the formalities contained in section 10. Otherwise,
the security interest will not be enforceable "by or against a third party."
The formal requirements for a non-possessory security interest in fixtures
are: (1) an agreement creating a security interest; (2) the signature of
the debtor, (3) a description of the collateral; and (4) a description of
the land concerned.8 6
In addition to the requirements in section 10, in order to properly
complete and register a financing statement under section 47(1) and
a real estate filing under section 54(1), a fixture-secured party must also
provide: (5) the names and addresses of the debtor and the secured party;
(6) if the debtor is an individual, his or her sex and birth date; (7) the
classification of the collateral as consumer goods, inventory, equipment,
or other, (8) if the collateral is classified as consumer goods, the principal
amount secured and the date of maturity, if any; and (9) the signature
of the secured party or the registered agent.87 As well, proper filing of
86 Sections 10(b) & I(x).
87 PpsA Regulations, R.R.O. 1980, Reg. 749, ss 3 & 14. Section 3(3) gives the fixture-secured
party the option to indicate on lines 13 to 15 of the financing statement that a fixture interest
does exist or may arise.
There is one other step - 'attachment' - required before the security interest will be perfected.
Attachment occurs when all elements in s. 12(1) have taken place. The rights of the debtor in
the collateral are then restricted by the rights of the secured party. Attachment is a term of art
in the PpsA. In order to avoid confusion in this article, the words 'attachment' and 'attach' will
be confined to their more technical meaning and will not be used to refer to the physical connection
of a chattel with the realty. Instead, the terms 'affix', 'affixation', 'annex', and 'annexation' will
be used in those instances where the chattel has become physically connected with the real estate.
For a discussion of the concept of attachment, see McLaren I, supra, note 8 at § 2.01.
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a real estate notice requires a registrable or legal description of the land
upon which the goods are affixed or are going to be affixed.88
Secured parties must satisfy all of these requirements if they desire
to obtain the greatest protection with respect to the fixtures they secure.89
Most of the formalities that fixture-secured parties must satisfy are
common to other secured parties who wish to create a valid and perfected
non-possessory security interest. Much has been written of the problems
facing secured parties generally who want to take and perfect their security
interests by registration.90 The task facing fixture-secured parties, however,
is even more difficult and occasionally impossible, because one of the
prerequisites for creating an enforceable security interest in fixtures is
an identification of the land to which the fixtures will be affixed. Moreover,
a legal description of the land is required in order to file a real estate
notice under section 54(1).
Providing a description of the land to which the fixtures will be
attached is onerous because the Act does not define or indicate what
will be an adequate "identification of the land concerned." Is a full-
blown legal description required? Or is something less, like a street address,
satisfactory? It is clear that the only description of land that will be
sufficient for a real estate filing under section 54(1) is a legal one. In
that instance, however, the rationale for requiring a full-blown legal
description is obvious. The real estate notice is to be filed where all
other encumbrances on the land are recorded, and the land registry system
indexes according to a number determined by the legal description. Thus,
the filing requirement is intended to tie the notice into the real estate
indexing system to ensure that title searchers will acquire notice of security
interests in fixtures in the course of a real estate title search. A similarly
88 Ibid., s. 24(1) and Form 1, 0. Reg. 838/81, s. 2. In addition to the legal description, a
real estate notice contains the name and address of the debtor and secured party, a brief description
of the collateral, and the signature of the secured party. However, the secured party already has
this information since, with the exception of the legal description, it was needed in order to register
the financing statement. On whether a legal description of the land is required for the purpose
of section 10, see text accompanying notes 91 & 92, infra.
89 A secured party might have to satisfy additional requirements of form imposed by other
statutes and referenced by the PpsA. For example, s. 17 of the PPsA provides that the Sale of Goods
Act, R.S.O. 1980, c. 462 [hereinafter SGA] governs the sales aspects of a secured transaction. See
also s. 68, which provides, in contrast to the general conflict rule of this section, that in the case
of a conflict between the provisions of the Consumer Protection Act, R.S.O. 1980, c. 87 and those
of the PPSA, the former prevails. For a brief discussion of those sections in the Consumer Protection
Act that have an impact on the PPSA, see Ziegel & Geva, supra, note 25 at 981-82.
90 See, eg., J.S. Ziegel, "Recent and Prospective Developments in the Personal Property Security
Law Area" (1985) 10 Can. Bus. LJ. at 154-59; W.S. Robertson, "Different Forms of Security
Agreements" in D.E. Baird & F. Bennett, eds., Handbook on the Personal Property Security Act
(Toronto: Insight Educational Services, 1982) at 21-24; E. B. Leonard, "Problems with the psA"
in Baird & Bennett, ibid. at 127-31; and J.S. Ziegel, "PPSA Registration Problems" (1978-79) 3
Can. Bus. LJ. 222.
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compelling argument, however, does not exist for requiring such an
exacting description under section 10(b). American courts have interpreted
a comparable section of the 1962 Code9 as not requiring a legal
description of the land.92 Those decisions, however, cannot automatically
be transported to Ontario because the 1962 Code also contains section
9-110, which is not found in the PPSA. That section provides that "[fior
the purposes of [Article 9], any description of personal property or real
estate is sufficient, whether or not it is specific, if it reasonably identifies
what is described." One can only hope that Ontario courts will realize
how unnecessary and overly exacting a demand requiring a legal
description is upon fixture-secured parties (as well as other parties with
an interest in crops, oil, gas, minerals, or timber) and will therefore, even
in the absence of a section 9-110 guideline, follow the approach taken
by American courts.
Even if Ontario courts do give a wide meaning to the word
"identification," such a construction will still not be wide enough for
some secured parties. Occasionally, secured parties may know or have
reason to believe that the goods will become fixtures but be unable to
ascertain where they might be affixed. For example, this would occur
when the debtor is a large business organization with real estate located
in numerous counties throughout the province and the debtor has granted
a security interest on all of a particular type of equipment that is or
may be classified as fixtures. In such instances, the secured party's dilemma
is acute because if the security agreement fails to identify the lands upon
which the goods are going to be affixed, then the secured party will
not have a security interest that is enforceable "by or against a third
party."
Given that some secured parties could never or only with some
difficulty satisfy this requirement, why then did the drafters of the PPSA
include it in section 10(b)? It certainly does not encourage the commitment
of new capital to the improvement of real estate and the modernization
and expansion of industry. Moreover, the former Conditional Sales Act
did not require, as a condition of validity, that the contract identify the
related land when fixtures were involved in the transaction.93 Similarly,
a description of the land has not been necessary in the other PPSA
91 Section 9-203(1)(b).
92 See, ag., United States v. Big Z Warehouse (1970), 7 U.C.C. Rep. 1061 at 1065 (S.D. Ga.);
Chanute Production Credit Association v. Weir Grain and Supply, Inc. (1972), 499 P.2d 517 (Kan.
S.C.). In both of these cases, the collateral in dispute was crops.
93 Section 2(a).
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jurisdictions. 94 The only explanation is that this is simply another example
of a section taken blindly from the 1962 Code without the drafters realizing
all of the implications of their action. Presumably realizing the dilemma
the provision has created for some fixture-secured parties, the Advisory
Committee has recommended that it be deleted in the next revision of
the PPSA.95
Nevertheless, the problem of registering in each county involved
when an organization grants a security interest on all of its equipment
of a particular type that may be classified as fixtures will still persist
under the 1985 Draft Act. For those secured parties who are not worried
about conflicts with holders of subsequent interests in the real estate,
the inability to file a real estate notice will not be of any concern. For
others who want to be protected against subsequent interests in the real
estate, the PPSA registration system is simply not set up to accommodate
their practical difficulties. 96
IV. CONSTRUCTION MORTGAGES
A. The Problem and the Compromise
Another problem in section 36 is the possible conflict between the
construction mortgagee and the holder of a fixture security interest. The
94 See s. 10(b) Manitoba PPsA; s. 10(l)(b) Saskatchewan PPsA; s. 10(1)Ib) Yukon pPsA: supra,
note 10.
95 See 1985 Draft Act, supra, note 15 at 20.
96 Other practical difficulties arise when the secured parties do not know how the debtor
plans to use the goods and hence are unable to predict whether they will become fixtures; or
when the debtor initially tells the secured party that the goods will remain chattels but later annexes
them to the realty so they become fixtures unbeknownst to the secured party. If these secured
parties want their already perfected security interests to be effective against the parties described
in s. 36(3), then the secured parties must follow their debtors around to determine how the goods
are actually used.
Moreover, clauses in security agreements stating that the debtor agrees that "the goods are
not to be or become a fixture and are at all times to be and remain personal property" are only
effective where the parties to the agreement are the only claimants. In such cases, their rights
will be governed by their agreement (see, ag., Scarth v. The Ontario Power and Flat Company
(1894), 24 O.R. 446 (H.C.); Herriott v. Cronin (1935), [1935] 2 D.L.R. 637 at 639 (Man. C.A.);
Re Maple Leaf Coal Co. Ltd (1951), [1951] 4 D.L.R. 210 (Alta. C.A.); Publishers Holding Ltd
v. Industrial Development Bank (1974), [1974] 4 W.W.R. 440 at 442 (Man. Q.B.); see generally
Report on Landlord and Tenant Law, supra, note 22 at 75, where the Ontario Law Reform Commission
took the view that parties can, by agreement, alter their rights to fixtures and chattels). The intention
to alter the rights to the articles, however, must be clearly manifested in the agreement by the
use of clear and unambiguous words as opposed to general terms (see, ag., Oromocto Motor Inn
Ltd v. Wilson (1985), 38 R.P.R. 33 at 37 (N.B.C.A.)). As well, an agreement will not be effective
against third parties (ag., subsequent purchasers or mortgagees) who are without notice of the
agreement (see, ag., Berlin Interior Hardwood Co. v. Colonial Investment and Loan Co., supra, note
41 at 646; Canadian Bank of Commerce v. Lewis and Lewis (1907), 12 B.C.R. 398 at 400 (Full
Court); Amic Mortgage Investment Corp. v. Investors Group Trust Co. Ltd, supra, note 61 at 59,
61) unless the fixtures in dispute fall within the exception for 'tenants' fixtures' (see notes 160
to 167, infra and accompanying text).
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drafters envisioned a situation in which a landowner borrows money
in order to erect a building or some other improvement on the land.
The lender receives a mortgage on the land before the construction begins.
The construction mortgagee makes a commitment sufficient to ensure
completion of the project. As a result, it is essential that the whole project,
including materials and equipment, be free of liens superior to that of
the mortgagee. Usually in larger loans the loan agreement expressly
requires the owner-mortgagor to provide the lender with documentation
to ensure that the work is progressing as expected, that the materials
and equipment are free of security interests, and that there are sufficient
funds available to complete the project.
Occasionally, however, the owner-mortgagor might obtain some
needed materials and equipment on credit subject to purchase money
security interests in favour of the suppliers. If the goods in question become
fixtures when installed on the land, and if the chattel suppliers are given
priority over the construction lender, the latter may be left with security
insufficient to cover the loan.97 On the other hand, if the fixture suppliers
are subordinated to the construction lender, they will have donated their
goods to feed the lender's security even though they have a strong equitable
claim to the goods, at least until payment is made.98
Pre-PPSA decisions in Ontario generally preserved a chattel sup-
plier's encumbrances after the chattel became a fixture.99 Section 36(1)
of the PPSA reflects the continuation of this long-standing policy. The
rationale underlying this priority is that 'new money' should prevail over
'old money' because the latter has not relied on the acquisition of the
fixture as security. Therefore, the argument goes, old money should not
be unjustly enriched at the expense of new money, which justifiably relies
on the goods to secure their purchase price. This assumption is, however,
specious where construction mortgagees are involved because they make
their advances with the clear expectation that the advances will be secured
by the new building and its fixtures. One can, therefore, argue that
construction mortgagees have a stronger claim to priority than other
holders of pre-affixation interests in the land because construction
mortgagees can be considered to have a reliance interest in the fixtures.
The PPSA tries to reach a compromise between these two competing
claims. If a construction-mortgagee advances money to enable the
owner-mortgagor to purchase goods needed for the construction project
97 F. Leary & P.L. Rucci, "Fixing Up the Fixture Section of the ucc" (1969) 42 Temp. L.Q.
355 at 397-98 n. 99.
98 Adams, supra, note 7 at 852.
99 See note 46, supra and accompanying text.
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and, instead, the owner-mortgagor purchases the same goods (which
will become fixtures once they are installed on the land) from suppliers
on credit subject to a purchase money security interest, then the fixture
supplier will prevail in a priority contest with the construction mortgagee
by virtue of section 36(1).100
On the other hand, if a construction mortgagee makes an advance
after the fixtures have been affixed to the realty then under section
36(3)(c)101 the construction mortgagee will be given priority over the
suppliers of the fixtures unless the fixture suppliers had filed notices of
their security interests in the proper land registry office before the advance
was made or the construction mortgagee knew of the security interest
when the advance was made. This section, therefore, protects construction
lenders from a danger against which they could not effectively guard
- making an advance against materials and equipment affixed to the
land without knowing that the goods are already secured by unknown
and undiscoverable claims. 02
B. Problems of Interpretation
The use of overly broad and ambiguous wording in subsection
36(3)(c) will create a number of interpretive headaches for the courts.
The three most serious problems inherent in this subsection are: (1) the
meaning to be attached to the word "subsequent"; (2) the scope of the
protection offered; and (3) the meaning that should be given to the words
"contracted for."
1. The meaning of "subsequent"
Although the general policies embodied in subsections 36(1) and
(3) are clear enough, nowhere does the Act identify the point in time
to which the advance must be "subsequent." The problem arises because
the time reference of subsection 36(3)(c) is vague when it speaks of
"prior" encumbrances and "subsequent" advances. It is surprising that
100 Section 36(1) provides the following: "Subject to subsection (3) of this section and
notwithstanding subsection 34(3), a security interest that attached to goods before they became
fixtures has priority as to the goods over the claim of any person who has an interest in the real
property."
101 Section 36(3)(c) provides that:
The security interest [sic] referred to in subsections (1) and (2) are subordinate to the interest
of ... a creditor with a prior encumbrance of record on the real property in respect of
subsequent advances, if ... the subsequent advance under the prior encumbrance was made
or contracted for.., without actual notice of the security interest.
102 Adams, supra, note 7 at 853.
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the drafters of the Act were insensitive to this ambiguity given that the
Conditional Sales Act expressly dealt with this problem. 03 Nevertheless,
one knows that the event marking the time at which 'subsequentness'
begins must be before a fixture supplier has registered a notice of the
security interest in the proper land registry office, because only advances
made before a fixture supplier has registered a real estate notification
are entitled to priority under subsection 36(3)(c). That leaves two possible
events that could mark the dividing line: when the security interest of
the fixture holder attaches (almost always the time the sale is concluded
between the seller of the fixture and the debtor); or when the fixture
is affixed to the premises. 0 4
Most, if not all, commentators argue that no mortgagee can reason-
ably rely on a fixture as security until it has been affixed to the property.t
05
This rationale was adopted in House v. Long,0 6 a decision under the
1962 Code. That case involved, inter alia, the priority between a purchase
money security interest and a construction mortgage. The court held
that the critical time was when the goods became fixtures because only
after that time could a prior mortgagee be induced by the owner-mort-
gagor to make additional advances.
The reasoning of the courts and commentators is persuasive because
the choice of annexation as the event marking priority is consistent with
the rationale suggested above as to how subsections 36(1) and (3)(c)
should interact in striking a compromise between these competing
parties. 07 Moreover, this would be consistent with the Conditional Sales
103 Section 14(4) of the Conditional Sales Act provided that
[w]here the goods have become affixed to the land or are fixtures and there is already
registered against the land a mortgage or charge, all payments or advances made on the
mortgage or charge after the goods have become affixed or have become fixtures and before
registration of notice of the contract under this section have priority over the rights of the
seller under the contract [emphasis added].
See also Poloniato v. Regina Macaroni Holding Ltd (1955), [1955] 4 D.L.R. 845 (Ont. H.C.). See
also Rayner & McLaren, supra, note 23 at 180.
104 White & Summers, supra, note 25 at 932.
105 McLaren II, supra, note 8 at 256. A similar argument has also been made by commentators
of the 1962 Code. See, eg., Kripke, supra, note 11 at 72; Adams, supra, note 7 at 853; Gordon,
supra, note 12 at 682-83; Coogan 1B, supra, note 11 at § 17.04[1] n.18; S. Goodkin, "The Ambiguous
Statutory Machinery Pertaining to Fixtures Under The Uniform Commercial Code: Whether the
New 9-313 Provision Effectively Eliminates Prior Criticism of the Old 9-313" (1973) 27 Ark.
L. Rev. 482 at 498-99. Professor Gilmore would also extend protection to those advances made
after attachment but before the goods became fixtures if the mortgagee knew when the advance
was made that the debtor was acquiring the goods with the intent to affix them to the land- Gilmore,
supra, note 11 at 825-28.
106 (1968), 244 Ark. 718. See also Babson Credit Plan, Inc. v. Cordele Production Credit
Association (1978), 24 U.C.C. Rep. 437 (Ga. C.A.).
107 See text accompanying notes 100 to 102, supra.
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Act.108 It would also be more consistent with a fixture seller's reasonable
expectations and the business realities of selling such goods than any
other interpretation.0 9 For instance, if a mortgagee who made an advance
after attachment but before installation was given priority under sub-
section 36(3)(c), then a secured seller of fixtures would have to file before
or simultaneously with the sale. Therefore, fixture sellers could neither
wait for installation nor benefit from the ten-day grace period that purchase
money security sellers of non-fixture goods enjoy under section 34(3). t 10
The drafters of the PPSA could not have intended such a result. They
were aware that requiring advance registrations in purchase-money
transactions, particularly those involving the sale of consumer goods and
commercial equipment, would be impracticable because such transactions
are often not negotiated in advance. It is unrealistic to assume that a
clerk can ensure that all the necessary legal documents are properly
executed and registered before the goods are handed over to an important
customer."'
2. Who qualifies for protection?
A second interpretive problem concerns the scope of the protection
offered. Although section 36(3)(c) is believed to be aimed primarily at
construction mortgagees,112 the terms of the section refer broadly to any
"creditor with a prior encumbrance of record on the real property" who
makes a "subsequent advance under the prior encumbrance." t3 This
subsection, therefore, can be used to give priority to any real estate
mortgagee as long as the mortgage contains a valid future advance clause.
The possibility therefore exists that the section may allow a mortgagee
to win a priority contest against a fixture financer when the former has
no reliance interest and the latter has all of the equities."14
108 See note 103, supra.
109 See, eg., White & Summers, supra, note 25 at 833, where they state that sellers of fixtures
generally "feel no pressing need to file [a real estate notification] before the goods are installed."
110 Ibid
II1 See generally McLaren I, supra, note 8 at § 6.01[3][a][ii].
112 See Adams, supra, note 7 at 851, 853; Kripke, supra, note 11 at 50-51.
113 The Act does not define "encumbrance." It would certainly include a mortgage or a charge
on the real estate. What more might be covered within this term is purely conjecture. See, however,
the Mortgages Act, R.S.O. 1980, c. 296, s. 1(b), which defines an "encumbrance" to include "a
mortgage in fee or for a less estate, a trust for securing money, a lien, and a charge of a portion,
annuity or other capital or annual sum." Professor Gilmore, who also questioned why the
"encumbrance" should be "of record," said that it was simply an unexplained addition to the 1956
revision of Article 9-313: Gilmore, supra, note 11 at 828.
114 See, ag., the hypothetical case in Gordon, supra, note 12 at 680.
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3. The meaning of the phrase "contracted for"
Third, there is uncertainty as to how the courts are going to interpret
the phrase "contracted for." In fact, if "contracted for" is given the broadest
possible reading, the section might be interpreted as meaning that any
advance made under a prior mortgage that contains a clause providing
for future advances will have been "contracted for" from the time the
mortgage was executed, regardless of when the advance is made. All
advances made by the mortgagee will then be given priority over an
intervening fixture security interest even though a notice of the security
interest has been filed in the proper land registry office or the mortgagee
has knowledge of it at the time the advance is made.
Surely, the fixture security interest should not be subordinated to
future advances simply because the advances were "contracted for" before
the goods were affixed to the realty. In fact, it is rather doubtful that
an interpretation that would seriously undermine the long-standing policy
in Ontario of protecting a fixture seller's encumbrance was intended by
the drafters of the PPSA. 115 Such a reading would also be at odds with
the Anglo-Canadian common-law position that does not give priority
to advances made under a first mortgage once the first mortgagee has
received actual notice of a subsequent encumbrance.1 6 Finally, as a
practical matter, it would become very difficult for someone who has
an outstanding mortgage to purchase fixtures on credit because of the
risks fixture sellers or financers would have to assume in such situations.117
Why then are the words "contracted for" found in the section?
Although a literal interpretation of "contracted for" goes too far from
the fixture-secured party's point of view, 'made before real estate
notification' does not seem to go far enough from the construction
mortgagee's point of view. As was noted earlier,118 construction mort-
gagees deserve more protection than other holders of pre-affixation land
interests because the former can be considered to have a reliance interest
in the fixtures. Reconciling such conflicting claims is never an easy task.
115 On numerous occasions courts and commentators have referred to Ontario's long-standing
policy. See, eg., Cober Elevator Manufacturing Co. v. Greenberg (1942), [1942] 2 D.L.R. 791 (Ont.
C.A.); Dominion Lock Joint Pipe Co. v. York (1929), [1929] 4 D.L.R. 806 at 808 (Ont. C.A.).
See generally Fetzer, supra, note 46 at 583-86; JJ. Robinette, "Fixtures - Conditional Sale of
Chattel - Ontario Land Titles Act" (1931) 9 Can. B. Rev. 381 at 382-83.
116 See, eg., Hopkinson v. Rolt (1861), 9 H.L. Cas. 514, 11 E.R. 829; Bradford Banking Co.,
Ltd v. Henry Briggs Son & Co., Ltd (1886), 12 App. Cas. 29 (H.L.); Union Bank of Scotland v.
National Bank of Scotland (1886), 12 App. Cas. 53 (H.L. Scot.); Pierce v. Canada Permanent Loan
and Savings Co. (1895), 25 O.R. 671 (C.A.); Marshall-Wells v. Alliance Trust Company (1920),
[1920] 1 W.W.R 907 at 912 (Alta. C.A.). This common law position has been codified in Ontario.
See, s. 68 of the Registry Act, R.S.O. 1980, c. 445, as am. and s. 93(4) of the Land Titles Act,
R.S.O. 1980, c. 230, as am.
I1" Coogan IB, supra, note I1 at § 17.05[1].
118 See text following note 99, supra.
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The American case law on future advances, however, distinguishes
between 'obligatory' and 'optional' future advance arrangements."19 In
all probability, the "contracted for" provision, which was first added by
the ucc's Editorial Committee in the 1956 revision of Article 9-313,120
was intended to refer to only obligatory future advance arrangements;' 2'
that is, mortgagees making an obligatory future advance are entitled
to priority over intervening liens and encumbrances even though the
mortgagees are aware of such intervening interests when they make the
advance. An optional advance, in contrast, would only give the mortgagee
priority when unaware of the intervening security interests. The rationale
for this distinction seems to be that mortgagees who are contractually
committed to make the advances have no means of protecting themselves,
while in the case of optional advances, mortgagees can refuse to make
the advances once they have become aware of the intervening security
interests. 22
Assuming that "contracted for" is limited to obligatory advances,
one can appreciate the aims of the revisers in trying to better balance
the claims of these competing parties. There are, however, two potentially
serious problems with this aim from a Canadian standpoint. The first
one is of a more general nature, dealing with the uncertainty in application
of the doctrine; the second is more specific to Canada, and concerns
the appropriateness of the doctrine against a Canadian common-law
background. 23
119 See generally G.E. Osborne, G.S. Nelson & D.A. Whitman, Real Estate Finance Law (St.
Paul's Minn.: West Publishing, 1979) at § 12.7; L. Skipworth, "Should Construction Lenders Lose
Out on Voluntary Advances If a Loan Turns Sour?" (1977) 5 Real Estate LJ. 221; B.E. Griffith
& C.D. Kipp, "Mortgages to Secure Future Advances: Problems of Priority and the Doctrine of
Economic Necessity" (1975) 46 Miss. LJ. 433 at 437-38; R. Kratovil & RJ. Werner, "Mortgages
for Construction and the Lien Priorities Problem: The 'Unobiligatory' Advance" (1974) 41 Tenn.
L. Rev. 311 at 314; Coogan 1B, supra, note 11 at §§ 21.05-21.07; Gilmore, supra, note 11 at
916 n. 1, 925-31 and authorities cited therein. See also Annotation, 80 A.L.R.2d 179 at 191-
96.
120 Leary & Rucci, supra, note 97 at 403; Gilmore, ibid at 828.
121 Gilmore, ibid at 927-28; Adams, supra, note 7 at 854.
122 Gilmore, !bid at 829, 927-28; Adams, ibid at 854; Griffith & Kipp, supra, note 119 at
441-42.
123 Professor Gilmore, ibid at 926, argues that there is another problem with the obligatory
and optional future advance distinction; it is conceptually invalid because a commitment to lend
money can be breached without legal liability. He asserts as a general rule that a contract to
lend money will not be specifically enforced. Therefore, no matter how bound lenders may be,
a court will never order specific performance of the obligation to lend money. If this is so, then
all advances are, in reality, optional. He further argues that no damages will be awarded against
the lender. This argument is based on the view that if the borrower is unable to get a replacement
loan or is only able to get one at a much higher rate of interest, the damages suffered by the
borrower will not be recoverable because "they will be the result of the borrower's own deteriorated
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a) The obligatory-optional distinction
On the surface, the distinction between an obligatory and an optional
advance would seem to be a simple one to apply. If construction
mortgagees are under no contractual obligation, but may elect to make
additional advances, then such disbursements are optional future advances.
On the other hand, if construction mortgagees desire that none of their
advances be subordinated by any intervening liens or encumbrances, then
they must make their advances pursuant to a contractual obligation.
124
Because any competent lawyer could draft a mortgage or construction
loan agreement that read either way, one would naturally think that
the courts would have no trouble in dealing with this problem. In fact,
this doctrine has been severely criticized by all concerned parties in the
United States. Not only do construction lenders and their title insurers
despise it (for reasons which will become apparent later), but practitioners
credit standing." If Professor Gilmore's views are correct, the legitimacy of the doctrine is placed
in serious doubt. However, the soundness of Professor Gilmore's argument has been questioned
by a number of commentators in the United States (see, ag., Skipworth, supra, note 119 at 228;
G.S. Nelson & D.A. Whitman, Cases and Materials on Real Estate Transfer, Finance and Development,
2d ed. (St. Paul's, Minn.: West Publishing, 1981) at 850).
Would Gilmore's argument be valid in Canada? Traditionally, the Anglo-Canadian position
with respect to contracts to lend money has been not to specifically enforce them (see generally
G.H.L. Fridman, The Law of Contract in Canada, 2d ed. (Toronto: Carswell, 1986) at 717; A.G.
Guest, ed., Chitty on Contracts, vol. 1, 25th ed. (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 1983) at § 1768).
More recently, however, there have been strong dicta by a number of courts suggesting that specific
performance may be ordered where a mortgagee has a commitment to advance funds to a mortgagor
but nevertheless refuses. See, ag., Frankel Structural Steel Ltd v. Goden Holdings Ltd (1969), 5
D.L.R. (3d) 15 at 19 (Ont. C.A.), aff'd in part (1971), [1971] S.C.R 250 (Laskin J.A. (as he
then was) intimating that in an extraordinary set of circumstances specific performance might be
ordered by a court); Morguard Trust Co. v. 100 Main Street East Ltd (16 March 1978) (Ont. Div.
Ct.) [unreported] quoted at length in Reid v. Garnet B. Hallowell Ltd (1978), 10 R.P.R. 308 at
311-12 (M.C.) (O'Leary J. suggesting that a mortgagor could compel advancement or specific
performance if a mortgagee, who has made a commitment to advance funds up to a certain amount,
refuses to do so for capricious, arbitrary, and selfish reasons); Two Hills Rental Properties Ltd and
Bahnuik v. First City Trust Company (1982), [1982] 2 W.W.R. 555 at 570 (Alta. Q.B.), leave to
appeal dismissed (1983), [1983] 6 W.W.R. lvi (Alta. C.A.). As well, Fridman has suggested (ibid
at 717) that based on the rationale of a majority of the Law Lords in Beswick v. Beswick (1967),
[1968] A.C. 58 (H.L.), a court might order specific performance where an award of damages
might be purely nominal and where the party in breach would be unjustly enriched. Moreover,
in today's capital markets, it is likely that the rate of interest may change due to changes in monetary
policy that are entirely unrelated to the borrower's credit standing. Under such conditions, damages,
as even Gilmore acknowledges, would be recoverable. As a result, if an obligatory advance rule
existed in Canada, it could be defended as being conceptually sound under Canadian contract
law.
124 See, eg., S & S Ceiling & Partition Co. v. Calvon Corporation (1979), 410 N.E.2d 777
at 781 (Ohio C.A.) (promissory note and mortgage clearly contemplate the possibility of future
advances being made and give the maximum amount to be lent, but the wording used in the
documents does not create an obligation to disburse the funds; accordingly, the court held the
advances to be optional).
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and academics also say little in its defence.1 25 The distinction is un-
workable, unrealistic, and meaningless, and gives rise to irreconcilable
decisions. 26
The problems with this doctrine arise because economic realities
preclude such a simplistic approach of having arrangements solely optional
or obligatory. Instead, well-drafted construction loan agreements contain
provisions that list a number of events of default. Such provisions give
lenders the option of discontinuing disbursements when a certain event
occurs. It is generally recognized that these provisions represent good
lending practice.127 If lenders, however, are too diligent in protecting
themselves, they might inadvertently transform what would have been
obligatory advances into optional ones.
National Bank of Washington v. Equity Investors 28 illustrates this
point well. In that case, a bank's duty to advance funds under a construction
loan agreement was conditional upon the borrower providing the bank
with a current appraisal, retention of an architect, and periodic progress
reports of the project from the architect; all of these requirements were
125 One virtue of this rule in Professor Gilmore's opinion is the wide area of discretion provided
judges. As the learned Professor states, supra, note I 1 at 930:
There are few, if any, future advance clauses which an astute judge cannot, at will, classify
on one side or the other of the line between obligatory and voluntary. When he has picked
his label, he has also picked his priority rule. The distinction amounts to an absence of
rule; the judges are invited to pick and choose, case by case, ad hoe or ad hominem. This
is a recurrent phenomenon in a common law system when arguments for or against a given
position balance each other exactly. There is much to be said for allowing the mortgagor
freedom to choose new sources of financing and for allowing new lenders to come in with
secure liens. Only a very wise or a very foolish man would be willing to state categorically
where truth lies and to propose a rule for application in all possible situations. There is,
then, much to be said for having no rule at all, or only a make-believe rule, and for letting
judges decide: judges are not necessarily wiser than other people, but they are paid to decide
things.
But see Osborne, Nelson & Whitman, supra, note 119 at 762-63, who say that although Gilmore's
argument is appealing, it is "ultimately unconvincing" because the cost of learning the answer
in a given case (le, lawyers' fees, court costs, and the time of witnesses) is far too high. The
authors, therefore, conclude that "a rule which could be applied with certainty, whatever its content,
would be preferable." To the same effect, see Nelson & Whitman, supra, note 123 at 851.
126 Kratovil and Werner describe the obligatory-optional advance doctrine as "a legalistic
test which is out of touch with reality." It also gives rise to excessive amounts of litigation, "yielding
inconsistent and often surprising results in light of the language of the statutes": Kratovil & Werner,
supra, note 119 at 314, 321. Another commentator has described the present system as being
unpredictable and too often fortuitous: Osborne, Nelson & Whitman, ibid at 763. Professor Gilmore
has probably used the most figurative and vibrant language to show his disappointment with the
present doctrine. In his seminal work (supra, note 11), Gilmore has said that "[t]he distinction,
deeply rooted as it is, has little or nothing to recommend it conceptually; it may be helpful, by
way of clearing away a little underbrush before moving into the forest .. " (at 926). As well,
he later described the distinction between obligatory and optional advances as being essentially
meaningless. It is, instead, merely "a way of avoiding a hard and fast rule in a situation where
the equities seem to be in even balance" (at 938).
127 National Bank of Washington v. Equity Investors (1973), 506 P.2d 20 at 28 (Wash. S.C.).
128 Ibid
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to be "satisfactory" to the bank. In addition, funds were "to be advanced
at such times and in such amounts as the Lender shall determine"; they
were not due, moreover, unless the bank believed that all the work for
which the advance had been made was done in a good and workmanlike
manner. The construction loan agreement also provided that the bank
was not obligated to disburse more than 90 percent of the loan until
the construction was completed and the property free of all kinds of
liens except the bank's. The Washington Supreme Court concluded that,
because the bank's discretionary powers under the contract were so broad
and covered so many possible situations, the bank, in effect, had no
definite obligation to advance any funds. As the Court said: "The lender,
in reserving such broad protective discretion, thereby rendered the
advances optional rather than obligatory for the purpose of determining
the priority of liens."'129
The inadequacies and uncertainties of the obligatory-optional ad-
vance rule become even more apparent where lenders have not reserved
excessive discretion and have kept 'events of default' clauses to a
minimum. When such clauses are relatively unsophisticated and thus
easy to fulfill, the courts have been generally willing to hold any advances
that follow as obligatory.1 30 But where borrowers fail to perform or meet
a condition of the loan agreement or lenders fail to assert all of the
conditions (even those conditions that are far more restrictive than are
required in the circumstances), a majority of the courts have held that
such an event causes the advances to become voluntary.131
129 Ibid at 29. It has been held that future advances made under a mortgage agreement
will not be obligatory unless the mortgage and the other documents bind the lender to disburse
a certain amount of money under definite conditions or in a particular manner Wayne Building
& Loan Co. of Wooster v. Yarborough (1967), 228 N.E.2d 841 at 858 (Ohio S.C.); Akron Savings
& Loan Co. v. Ronson Home% Inc (1968), 238 N.E.2d 760 at 763 (Ohio S.C.).
130 See, ag., Irwin Concrete, Inc v. Sun Coast Propertie; Inc (1982), 653 P.2d at 1336-37
(Wash. C.A.) (under the deed of trust, lender obligated to disburse funds requested by builder once
the lender was able to verify that the cost of the work done by the builder equalled the amount
requested); Ashdown Hardware Co. v. Hughes (1954), 267 S.W.2d 294 (Ark. S.C.) (under the terms
of the mortgage, mortgagee obligated to make advances as each cabin to be built by the owner
is completed and insured); Local Federal Savings & Loan Ass'n v. Davidson & Case Lumber (1952),
255 P.2d 248 (Okla. S.C.) where the mortgagee was bound by the terms of a mortgage to advance
funds at various states of construction. The clause, which required the owner to give proper evidence
that all materials and labour have been paid at the time of each disbursement of funds, was construed
by the Court as not giving the mortgagee the right to withhold the proceeds of the loan or to
pay it out as the mortgagee desired. See also the cases listed in 80 A.L.R.2d 179 at 198-99.
131 See, eg., Housing and Mortgage Corp. v. Allied Const Inc. (1953), 97 A.2d 802 at 806
(Penn. S.C.) (progress payments made ahead of schedule held to be optional); J.l. KCslak Mortgage
Corporation v. William Matthews Builder, Inc (1972), 287 A.2d 686 Del. S.C.), aff'd (1973), 303
A.2d 648 (Del. C.A.) (construction loan agreement provided that the lender would not be obligated
to make advances unless the mortgagor provided the lender with documentation showing that prior
advancements had been used to pay subcontractors and material suppliers; notwithstanding the
language, the lender made advances without requiring receipts; held by the court that the advances
were optional and subordinate to the filed mechanics' liens).
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Furthermore, sound lending practices would suggest that a lender retain
the right to complete construction if the borrower should abandon or
take too long in completing the project. However, several courts have
held that advances used to complete the building are optional and are
thus subordinate to a mechanic's liens.1 32 One commentator has suggested
that such cases vividly demonstrate the inadequacy of this doctrine: "It
fails at the very moment it is needed. If the job gets into trouble, the
event of default clause operates in many states to render advances made
thereafter optional."33
Therefore, the obligatory-optional doctrine, as currently enunciated
by American courts, is badly flawed. Lenders who attempt to create
obligatory advances, yet provide themselves with some protection, can
never be totally certain that a court will subsequently hold the advances
to be obligatory. 34 The most one can say, after reviewing the American
case law, is that there are few, if any, future advance clauses that a
judge cannot reasonably classify as optional. 35 As a result, if "contracted
for" is, as suggested above, limited to only obligatory advances, the scope
of protection provided to construction mortgagees has not been expanded
There are, however, some cases that have held that a failure to fulfill a condition of a loan
agreement does not necessarily destroy the obligatory nature of the advance. See, eg., Hyman v.
Hauff (1893), 33 N.E. 735 at 737 (N.Y.C.A.) and Landers-Morrison-Christenson Co. v. Ambassador
Holding Co. (1927), 214 N.W. 503 at 506 (Minn. S.C.), which held that the undertaking of lenders
to make future advances is not deemed optional within the rule that gives subsequent encumbrances
priority over optional advances made after they have been recorded unless it appears from the
lenders' agreement that they have a right to decline to make them. However, where the right
to refuse to make the advances depends upon a breach of the agreement by the borrower, lenders
are not required to take the chance of establishing such a breach to the satisfaction of a court
but rather may disregard the breach and make the stipulated advances in reliance on their security.
See also Weissman v. Volino (1911), 80 A. 81 at 82 (Conn. S.C.). One commentator has suggested
that it is possible to understand these three cases as a recognition by the courts of the "economic
dilemma" facing lenders under the obligatory-optional advance doctrine: Skipworth, supra, note
119 at 225 n. 5.
132 See, ag., Yost-Linn Lumber Co. v. Williams (1932), 9 P.2d 324 (Cal. Dist. Ct.), where
the mortgage agreement provided that if construction was abandoned prior to completion the
mortgagee could, after thirty days, at its option, complete the building using the unexpended funds
remaining in its hands. The court held that the funds expended by the mortgagee after the builder's
default were voluntary and subordinate to the mechanic's liens.
133 Kratovil & Werner, supra, note 119 at 315 (emphasis in original).
134 One possible drafting approach is to provide in the mortgage or the construction loan
agreement that no default shall occur despite the occurrence of any of the default conditions until
the lender gives the borrower written notice of default. Another approach is to provide, inter alia,
that
[flunds advanced by the lender in the reasonable exercise of his judgment that the same
are needed to complete the improvement or to protect his security are to be deemed obligatory
advances hereunder and are to be added to the total indebtedness secured by the note and
mortgage and said indebtedness shall be increased accordingly.
The success of either of these techniques is, however, uncertain: see Skipworth, supra, note 119
at 226-27.
135 Accord Osborne, Nelson & Whitman, supra, note 119 at 763; Skipworth, ibl at 227.
See also Professor Gilmore's observation quoted in note 125, supra.
[VOL. 24 No. 3
Fixture Financing Under the PPSA:
much from the protection previously provided by the words 'made before
real estate notification'. 36
b) The Canadian common-law position
An even more serious obstacle against construing the phrase "con-
tracted for" to mean obligatory advances is the Canadian common law
itself. In contrast to the American position, Canadian courts have
consistently held that advances made by a mortgagee under a contractual
obligation are not entitled to priority after the mortgagee receives actual
notice of an intervening security interest or encumbrance. 37 The courts
have, however, carved out a narrow exception by distinguishing between
advances voluntarily made after notice of an intervening encumbrance
and advances involuntarily made upon a liability to a third party already
in existence at the time the intervening encumbrance was created. 138
Therefore, there would have had to be a change in Canadian real
estate law before the American position could be adopted. Yet, nowhere
in the Catzman Committee's commentary on the PPSA is there a suggestion
136 The deficiencies of the doctrine have caused a number of states to modify it by legislation
giving all future advances the same priority as the original advance irrespective of their optional
character. For a discussion of the changes made in the individual states, see Osborne, Nelson &
Whitman, ibid at 768-71. A similar approach has also been taken by the drafters of the 1972
Code in respect of personal property. Article 9-105(I)(k) now provides: "An advance is made
'pursuant to commitment' if the secured party has bound himself to make it, whether or not a
subsequent event of default or other event not within his control has relieved or may relieve him
from his obligation."
137 See, ag., West v. Wil!iams (1899), 1 Ch. 132 (C.A.) at 143-44, where Lindley M.R. stated
that the giving of a subsequent encumbrance by the mortgagor on the security extinguished the
contractual obligation of the prior encumbrancer to make future advances. See also .W.A. Credit
Union v. Johnson (1978), 6 B.C.L.R. 271 (S.C.). See generally Rayner & McLaren, supra, note
23 at 163-64. In England, West v. Wi/!iams seems to have been overruled by statute. See Law
of Property Ac4 1925, 15 & 16 Geo. 5, c. 20, s. 94(1Xc). See generally E.L.G. Tyler, ed., Fisher
and Lightwood's Law of Mortgage, 9th ed. (London: Butterworths, 1977) at 459-62. But see D.B.
Kirkham, "Priorities of Mortgages - Mortgage for Present and Future Advances - Whether First
Mortgagee May Tack Future Advances where there Has Been an Intervening Encumbrance" (1968)
6 Alta. L. Rev. 310 at 312, where the author suggests that there is a certain amount of ambiguity
in the provision and that given the English Court of Appeal's reasoning in West v. Williams the
statute may not be applicable.
138 See, eg., Royal Bank of Canada v. Doering (1923), [1924] 1 D.L.R. 488 (B.C.S.C.) (first
mortgagee guaranteed a promissory note of the mortgagor); lngsway Electric Co., Ltd v. 330604
Ontario Ltd (1979), 27 O.R. (2d) 541 (H.C.) (first mortgagee gave an irrevocable commercial
letter of credit to a bonding company on the account of a contractor).
Cf Michael v. Bank ofMontreal(1982), 141 D.L.R. (3d) 169 at 172 (P.E.I.S.C.), where Campbell
L stated that:
the doctrine of tacking as it applies in Prince Edward Island is as follows: advances made
pursuant to a first mortgage but after a second mortgage is given, may be tacked on to
the prior security if the advances are made (a) without actual notice of the subsequent
mortgage, or (b) pursuant to a contractual obligation to advance the funds.
After holding that it had not been clearly demonstrated that the bank was irrevocably committed
to making the subsequent advances, he added (at 172) that "it is a fine point at common law
at which the bank must be shown to have been irrevocably obligated to supply further funds."
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that it contemplated changing Canadian real estate law. Indeed, given
that the statute under the Committee's consideration deals almost ex-
clusively with personal property, 39 it would be reasonable to assume
that well-established doctrines in real estate law are to remain in effect
unless expressly reversed.140 Moreover, the mere fact that the law
pertaining to future advances in regards to personal property appears
to have been altered141 is not sufficient to rebut the presumption that
real estate law has not been modified by the Committee. 142
How then is the phrase "contracted for" going to be interpreted
in Canada? Professor McLaren suggests that no advance could be deemed
"contracted for" until the mortgagee is satisfied that there are no
intervening encumbrances. 43 It would also be consistent with our
common-law position to construe "contracted for" to include the in-
frequent case of the mortgagee who, even after learning of the fixture
interest, is nevertheless compelled to honour the commitment. Construing
"contracted for" in this fashion means that the phrase would, in practical
139 See note 5, supra, and accompanying text.
140 See generally E.A. Driedger, Construction of Statutes, 2d ed. (Toronto: Butterworths, 1983)
at 107, 149-61; Lord Hailsham of St. Marylebone, ed., Halsbury's Laws of England, vol. 44, 4th
ed. (London: Butterworths, 1983) at § 904.
141 Most commentators believe that the Catzman Committee intended to change the common-
law rule in respect of future advances by providing that once a security interest has been perfected,
all future advances would be secured by a continuously perfected security interest in the collateral.
It is possible, however, to argue that each advance in a transaction contemplating future advances
creates a separate and distinct security interest. If the separate security interest approach rather
than the continuous security interest approach is followed by the courts, then the common-law
rule will not have been overturned. For a discussion of these two approaches, see McLaren I,
supra, note 8 at §§ 2.02[3], 6.01[2][c]; Catzman et. aL, supra, note I at 77-82. The debate as
to the preference of these two approaches can also be found in the United States. Compare Gilmore,
supra, note 11 at 933-42 (continuous security interest), and P.F. Coogan & N. Gordon, "The Effect
of the Uniform Commercial Code upon Receivables - Some Answers and Some Unresolved
Problems" (1962-63) 76 Harv. L. Rev. 1529 at 1549-51 (separate security interest).
In order to expressly reject the common-law rule with respect to future advances, the drafters
of the 1985 Draft Act, supra, note 15, have defined the term "future advance" to mean "the advance
of money, credit, or other value secured by a security agreement whether or not such an advance
is given pursuant to commitment" (at 3). Even more important, the drafters added two new priority
rules to deal expressly with the problem of future advances. Section 33(3) of the 1985 Draft Act
gives all future advances the same priority as the initial advance (at 47), thereby codifying the
continuous security interest approach. An exception to the above priority rule is s. 33(4). That
subsection provides that an execution creditor's right will not be subordinate to any advances made
after the secured party received written notification of the execution's existence unless the secured
party is contractually bound to make the advance, "whether or not a subsequent event of default
or other event not within the secured party's control has relieved or may relieve the secured party
from the obligation" (at 47).
142 Accord J.S. Ziegel, "Interaction of Personal Property Security Legislation and Security
Interests Under the Bank Act" (1986) 12 Can. Bus. Li. 73 at 83 n. 36, where it is possible to
infer from his remarks that he believes the PPsA has, at the very most, only changed the law of
future advances involving personal property. See generally Driedger, supra, note 140 at 211-14.
143 McLaren 11, supra, note 8 at 258.
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terms, have only a negligible impact on the underlying policy of section
36.144
c) The timing of the commitment
One final problem arising from the words "contracted for" concerns
the timing of the contract or commitment. Under the common law, any
commitment made before the conflicting security interest is known would
be protected.145 Section 36(3)(c) is, however, designed to protect only
prior encumbrancers who enter into commitments or make advances
in reliance of value already existing on the real estate. Therefore, a
commitment that is made before the chattel security interest attaches
or after attachment of the security interest but before affixation of the
fixture will not be in any sense "subsequent" within the meaning of
section 36(3)(c), 146 unless the mortgagee actually makes the advance after
the goods have become fixtures but before real estate notification.147
Thus, in most instances, construction mortgagees should only be
protected by section 36(3) if they make their commitment to advance
or make their advance: (1) after the security interest has attached; (2) after
the annexation of the fixture; and (3) before real estate notification.148
The only exception would be in those rare instances where the mortgagee
is compelled to make an involuntary advance.
C. The Need for Change
Some American commentators have argued that by construing the
present section as suggested above, the 1962 Code (and by extension
144 See note 148, infra and accompanying text.
145 See notes 116 & 137, supra.
146 See text accompanying notes 104 & 105, supra. See also Kripke, supra, note 11 at 72,
where the author states that while it is true that "all construction commitments are in a sense
made in expectation of a subsequent increase in the value of the real estate.., they are not made
in reliance thereon because the commitment is never binding until the lender is satisfied that the
value has been added free of lien." (emphasis in original) Accord McLaren I, supra, note 8 at
258.
147 It would be inequitable to penalize a construction mortgagee for making a prior commitment
if the advance was actually made after the goods had become fixtures because, presumably, the
lender had waited until the goods were affixed to the realty in order to search the real estate
records for notice of a security interest. Finding no information, the mortgagee incorrectly assumed
that value had been added free of any other encumbrances. Thus, the prima facie preference given
to a fixture financer is lost by the financer's inaction.
148 Kripke, supra, note 11 at 73. But see McLaren II, supra, note 8 at 258, where the author
states that both the commitment to advance and the advance itself must be made after the goods
have become fixtures. Such a rule not only unfairly penalizes the construction mortgagee, but also
fails to take into account all the possibilities that can arise in construction mortgage financing.
In a telephone conversation on March 6, 1986, Professor McLaren agreed with the foregoing but
noted that his position reflected the general practice of construction mortgagees who do not commit
their money until they have received proof that the work has been completed.
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the PPSA) gives construction mortgagees little protection against purchase
money security interests in fixtures that have been installed on the
mortgaged land during the course of construction. 149 Therefore, to protect
themselves, construction mortgagees would have to search the land
registry office before making each advance. The American Real Estate
Bar believed that this added duty was unfair. In response to its outcry,
changes were proposed to the fixture section. As a result, the fixture
section in the 1972 Code reverses the 1962 Code's position by adopting
a special priority rule favouring construction mortgagees whenever they
are in conflict with holders of fixture security interests. 50
A similar provision is unlikely to be adopted in Ontario for a number
of reasons. First, if the American approach were adopted, the province's
long-standing policy favouring sellers of fixtures would come to an end.
Such a change would force fixture vendors to change drastically the
way they secure their sales. For instance, they would have to enter into
subordination agreements with holders of conflicting real estate interests
in order to gain priority. If this was not possible, they would be unable
to rely on the goods sold as security, as they customarily do now. Instead,
they would have to look for other collateral to secure the sale or refuse
to sell to contractors when they believed a construction mortgage was
involved. The end result would be an increase in the costs and risks
of doing business for fixture suppliers.
Second, in contrast to the situation in the United States, no additional
burden is created in Ontario by requiring construction mortgagees to
search the land registry office before making each advance in order to
protect their advance against an intervening fixture security interest.
Prudent construction mortgagees already search the registry office before
149 In fact, the vulnerability of construction mortgagees was considered to be the "weightiest
objection" to § 9-313 of the 1962 Code- Adams, supra, note 7 at 908.
150 1972 Code, § 9-313(6). More specifically, if at the time the fixture is installed a construction
mortgage has already been recorded, then the mortgagee will have priority over the financer of
the newly installed goods that are part of the original construction. The provision makes no distinction
between optional and obligatory advances. Moreover, it appears from comparing the 1972 and
1962 Codes that the construction mortgage will prevail over an intervening security interest in
fixtures whether or not the mortgagee has knowledge of the security interest when an optional
advance is made. Nevertheless, the construction priority does not apply to additions made to a
building after completion of the improvement. Nor does the priority of § 9-313(6) extend to a
fixture security interest perfected through a fixture filing prior to the recording of the construction
mortgage (§ 9-313(4)(b)). For a more detailed discussion of this section, see Coogan 1, supra,
note 8 at § 3A.02[6]; Adams, ibid at 908-9. Cf Gilmore's more moderate reform proposal of
requiring fixture-secured parties with an interest in articles over some fixed dollar figure to give
actual notification of their security interests to record owners and mortgagees: Gilmore, supra,
note 11 at 834-36.
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making each advance because under the Construction Lien Act,151 formerly
the Mechanics' Lien Act,152 a lien has priority over all advances made
on account of a mortgage after notice in writing of the lien has been
given to the mortgagee making the payments or after registration of
the claim for the lien.
Third, even if they do not search the registry office before each
advance, on balance construction mortgagees are in a better position
than holders of the fixture security interests to guard against double
financing by controlling the disbursement of mortgage funds. They can,
for example, require an architect's certificate of completion before making
payments at any stage, retain a certain percentage of the loan until all
work is satisfactorily completed, and so on. Such measures ensure that
the construction mortgagee is not left with insufficient security to cover
the loan.
There is, therefore, no convincing reason why Ontario should adopt
the approach taken in the 1972 Code. Section 36, if construed as suggested
above, gives each party a satisfactory means of self-protection. Although
only dimly seen through the section's hazy language, the crucial policy
question focuses on who has the better reliance interest as between the
construction mortgagee and the fixture seller or financer. The section
needs clarification to eliminate its current uncertainties, but its underlying
policy should be retained.153
V. TENANTS' FIXTURES: APPLICABILITY OF SECTION 36
AND REAL ESTATE NOTIFICATION
There are two principal situations in which goods are sold subject
to a security interest to a debtor who does not own the land to which
the goods become affixed. The first case involves fixtures installed by
a tenant; the second, fixtures installed by a contractor working on someone
else's land. Neither of these situations is satisfactorily dealt with by the
PPSA.
Turning first to the tenants' case, suppose a tenant purchases an
air-conditioning unit, subject to a seller's security interest, and installs
it in a place of business that is being leased. Assume further that the
151 Supra, note 27, ss 80(4), (6). See generally D.N. Macldem & D.I Bristow, Construction
and Mechanics' Liens In Canada, 5th ed. (Toronto: Carswell, 1985) at § 63.
152 R.S.O. 1980, c. 261, s. 15(1).
153 See Gilmore, supra, note 11 at 832, where he explains why words like "contracted for"
should be eliminated from the 1962 Code: "An astute and sensitive court might manipulate'contracted
for' in such a way as to do only good, while avoiding evil. The prospect of such a delicate balancing
of equities is not, however, one that many lawyers will look forward to with unalloyed pleasure."
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landlord then gives a real estate mortgage and the conditional seller
subsequently wants to remove the air conditioner because the tenant
has gone into default. If the seller of the fixture never makes a real
estate filing under section 54(1)(a), can the conditional seller rely upon
the tenant's right to remove the air conditioner? Or is the seller's security
interest subordinated to the subsequent mortgagee's interest by virtue
of section 36(3)(a)? These questions cannot be answered with certainty
because the Act is not clear on whether 'fixtures' in the PPSA's sense
of the term includes tenants' or trade fixtures.
The uncertainty stems from the fact that courts have traditionally
treated tenants' fixtures very differently from other fixtures. 54 While
fixtures were generally viewed as having the legal characteristics of real
estate and not being removable, an exception was carved out for tenants'
fixtures. 55 Not only could tenants' fixtures be removed, but also they
had characteristics of both personal and real property. When viewed
as separate and removable property of the tenant, these fixtures would
be classified as chattels, 156 but when considered in connection with the
freehold, the same goods would become realty. 5 7 Because tenants' fixtures
are the only ones to have this dual character, it is possible to argue
that they do not come within the scope of section 36 of the PPSA.
If section 36 has no application to tenants' fixtures, a court must
look at the landlord and tenant relationship to determine the fixture seller's
rights, since they will depend on the tenant's rights. Under the common
law, a tenant may, in the absence of an agreement to the contrary, remove
154 Poole's Case (1703), 1 Salk. 368, 91 E.R. 320 is the leading case and one of the earliest
recorded inroads upon the basic principle. For even earlier cases, dating as far back as 1505,
see Niles, supra, note 39 at 565 n. 38.
155 Dean Niles has stated that "the maxim [quicquid plantatur solo solo cedit] furnishes the
common denominator of all fixture cases - the general principle to which the rules as to trade
or ornamental fixtures are somewhat anomalous exceptions." Niles, ibid at 561.
156 For example, when tenant's fixtures are being sold by a tenant, the transaction does not
have to be in writing or satisfy the requirements of the Statute of Frauds. Lee v. Gaskell (1876),
1 Q.B.D. 700; Hallen v. Runder (1834), 1 C.M. & R. 266, 149 E.R. 1080; Petrie v. Dawson (1845),
2 C. & K 138, 175 E.R. 58; Oswald v. Whitman (1889), 22 N.S.R. 13 (C.A.); Argles v. McMath,
supra, note 39 at 226; Liscombe Falls Gold Mining Co. v. Bishop, supra, note 51. The mortgages
that tenants give on their fixtures are called chattel mortgages: London & Westminster Loan and
Discount Co. Ltd v. Drake (1859), 6 C.B. (N.S.) 798, 141 E.R. 664. Moreover, judgment creditors
may seize tenant's fixtures under a writ of fleifacias, which would not be possible if the fixtures
were realty: see cases cited in note 164, infra.
157 Tenants' fixtures are considered, for instance, as part of the real estate under the Assessment
Act, R.S.O. 1980, c. 31, s. l(kXiv). See also Richmond and Richmond v. Ashton (1961), 31 D.L.R.
(2d) 12 (Ont. H.C.); Northern Broadcasting Company, Ltd v. The Improvement District of Mounloy
(1950), [19501 S.C.R. 502. Landlords do not have a right to distrain tenants' fixtures for arrears
in rent as they could their loose chattels: Hellawell v. Eastwood (1851), 6 Ex. 295, 155 E.R. 554.
See also Oosterhoff & Rayner, supra, note 23 at 1055 n. 4 and cases cited therein.
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personal chattels that have become affixed to the leased premises for
the purposes of carrying on a trade, so long as the removal can be effected
without serious injury to the freehold. 58 Accordingly, a court would hold
that the air conditioner in the above example was a trade fixture that
could be removed by the tenant, assuming that the removal would not
cause substantial damage. 159 A tenant's right of removal would also be
enforceable against a subsequent mortgagee of the freehold 160 so long
as the tenant was in possession of the land at the time the mortgage
was given by the owner or landlord because the tenant's occupation
is constructive notice to the subsequent mortgagee of the tenant's rights.161
Moreover, other parties can also benefit from a tenant's right of
removal because such rights are "of the nature and quality of property
rights as opposed to personal licences or contract rights."'162 Accordingly,
tenants have the power to transfer either a present or reversionary interest
in their fixtures to a stranger, to a succeeding tenant, or to the landlord. 63
As well, these fixtures are liable to be taken by parties who have no
interest in the land to which the chattel is affixed but who claim to
158 See notes 48 to 51, supra and accompanying text.
159 See, eg., Security Alert Systems Ltd v. Hart Leasing & Holding Ltd (1983), 39 Nfld. &
P.E.I.R. 340 (Nfld. Dist. Ct.) (air conditioner was a trade fixture that could be removed by the
tenant).
160 This is not the case if a tenant mortgages the leasehold. In such instances the harsh and
inflexible rules that are applicable as between vendor and purchaser, or mortgagor and mortgagee
of the freehold apply with equal force as between a tenant-mortgagor and mortgagee. See, ag.,
Meux v. Jacobs (1875), L.R. 7 H.L. 481 at 491; Warner v. Don and Rogers (1896), 26 S.C.R.
388 at 394. See also Manning, supra, note 23 at 309 where he states that
although the [tenant-]mortgagor may have the right as against his landlord to set up the
fact that the articles in dispute are trade fixtures, he has no such right as against his mortgagee,
for the law respecting trade fixtures does not apply to enable the mortgagor to remove
things which, as between landlord and tenant, are trade fixtures any more than does the
law between vendor and purchaser. One must always be careful to distinguish between the
cases as between landlord and tenant and the tenant and his mortgagee. [Emphasis added.]
161 Stack v. T. Eaton Co., supra, note 59 at 338; Thstlethwaite v. Sharp (1912), 7 D.LR.
801 (Sask. Dist. Ct.); Scott Fruit Co., Ltd v. Wilkins and Reece (1920), 54 D.L.R. 401 (Alta. S.C.);
Cronkhite v. Imperial Bank of Canada (1906), 14 O.L.R. 270 (Div. Ct.); Scarth v. Ontario Power
and Flat Co., supra, note 96. This principle also applies where the parties have determined their
respective rights as to the ownership and removability of fixtures in a written (Thistlethwaite v.
Sharp, 1bid) or under a verbal (Butterworth v. Ketchum (1904), 3 O.W.R. 844 (C.A.); Close v.
Belmont (1875), 22 Gr. 317) agreement. However, any rights that tenants are able to bargain for
over and above that which they are entitled to at common law will be lost if the requirements
demanded by the various recording Acts are not satisfied. See generally Campbell, supra, note
23 at 50-51.
162 Niles, supra, note 39 at 573. See also Argles v. McMath, supra, note 39 at 236.
163 Devine v. Callery, supra, note 59 at 510, Riddell J.; Oswald v. Whitman (1889), 22 N.S.R.
13 (C.A.); Wintemute v. Taylor (1919), [19191 2 W.W.R. 882 (B.C.S.C.); Gillett v. Lawrence Ltd
(1922), [1922] 2 W.W.R. 584 (Sask. C.A.). See also Niles, ibid at 571 and cases cited therein.
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have an interest in the article itself, such as a judgment creditor, 64 a
chattel mortgagee, 16' or a conditional seller. 166 If a tenant can remove
trade fixtures even against a subsequent purchaser or mortgagee of the
freehold, it intuitively follows that these same real estate interests should
not be able to stop a chattel encumbrancer from repossessing and removing
the tenant's trade fixtures. 67 There is then no justification for deliberately
requiring a financer of tenants' fixtures to file a notice in the proper
registry office because the real estate notification would serve no purpose.
There is, however, some difficulty with this position. Some court
decisions have referred to tenants' fixtures as retaining their "character
of chattels"'' 68 and thus not as part of the real estate. The generally accepted
Anglo-Canadian position, however, is that such fixtures have become
part of the realty and therefore can be included in an owner's real estate
conveyance subject to the tenant's right to sever and reconvert them
back into personal property. 69 Given this view, one would expect that
as long as the goods remained affixed to the land, the priority and
removability rules of section 36 would apply to resolve all conflicts arising
164 See, ag., Poole's Case, supra, note 154 at 320, where Lord Holt held that because tenants
have "a power coupled with an interest" in their removable fixtures, a judgment creditor has the
right to seize a tenant's trade fixtures under a writ of fier facias. In other words, even though
the fixtures have apparently become part of the realty and therefore are the property of the freeholder,
a judgment creditor can, nevertheless, dis-connect the fixtures, re-acquire full ownership in them,
and re-establish them as chattels. See also Minshall v. Lloyd (1837), 2 M. & W. 450 at 459, 150
E.R 834 at 839 (an execution creditor has "the same right of removal as the tenant"); Winn v.
Ingilby Bart and Hauxwall (1822), 5 B. & Aid. 625, 106 E.R. 1319; Evans v. Roberts (1826),
5 B. & C. 829 at 841, 108 E.R. 309 at 313; Argles v. McMath, supra, note 39 at 236.
165 London & Westminster Loan and Discount Co., Ltd v. Drake, supra, note 156 at 669 (E.R.).
166 Joseph Hall, supra, note 46 at 470, where Chief Justice Cameron stated that "[tihe position
of the owner of the goods which the tenant has affixed to the demised premises cannot be less
strong than that of the tenant's assignee." See also British Economical Lamp Company v. Empire
Mile End Ltd (1913), 29 T.L.R. 386 at 387 (KB.), Lawrence J. But cf Cormier, supra, note 8
at 168, where Salhany Co. Ct. J. said, without referring to any of the above cases, that a chattel
mortgagee or conditional vendor can only have the benefit of the tenant's rights of removal when
some agreement in writing or otherwise exists that transfers the debtor-tenant's interest to the
creditor and this agreement must be something more than simply the debtor-tenant having gone
into default on the security agreement.
167 Accord Ziegel, supra, note 46 at 516. In the United States, this right is well-established.
See, eg., A. Casner, ed., 5 American Law of Property (Boston: Little, Brown, 1952) § 19.12 at
48 n. 5. See also the cases collected in (1926), 45 A.L.R 967 and (1935), 98 A.L.R. 628.
168 See, ag., Blanshard v. Bishop (1911), 2 O.W.N. 996 (H.C.) (distress justifiable since a
tenant's trade fixture is a chattel); Simons v. Mulhall (1913), 24 O.W.R. 736 at 738 (H.C.) (trade
fixtures spoken of as chattels). See generally Oosterhoff & Rayner, supra, note 23 at 1009-10;
Manning, supra, note 23 at 293-94.
169 Stack v. T Eaton Co., supra, note 59 at 338, where Meredith CJ. held, inter alia, as
settled law:
That, even in the case of tenants' fixtures put in for the purposes of trade, they form part
of the freehold, with the right, however, to the tenant, as between him and his landlord,
to bring them back to the state of chattels again by severing them from the soil, and that
they pass by a conveyance of the land as part of it, subject to this right of the tenant,
See also Bain v. Brand, supra, note 39 at 770, Lord Cairns L.C.; 772, Lord Chelmsford.
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between realty and personalty interests in the trade fixtures. Indeed, the
only reported Canadian case on this issue has held that tenants' fixtures
are subject to section 36;170 such a view is also supported by most
commentators.'7'
Yet, there are some difficulties with this view as well. If tenants'
affixations are fixtures for PPSA purposes, then the Act changes landlord
and tenant law in at least two ways. First, in the example set out above,
a land mortgage is taken after a tenant has purchased and installed an
air conditioner subject to a chattel security interest of which the mortgagee
has no actual knowledge. Under the common law, the tenant is given
a right (good against a subsequent mortgagee) to remove the trade fixture
because the tenant's possession of the premises is sufficient warning to
a subsequent realty interest of the tenant's rights.172 Since these realty
interest parties have notice that the tenant may remove the trade fixtures,
it follows that other parties, such as one with a chattel security interest
granted by the tenant, should be able to derive their priority from the
tenant's right of removal. 73 Section 36(3) is, however, not drafted to
yield this result. Under that provision, security interests in fixtures "are
subordinate to the interest of... a subsequent purchaser or mortgagee
for value of an interest in the real property ... if the subsequent purchase
or mortgage was made.., without actual notice of the security interest."174
[emphasis added] Accordingly, mere notice of the tenant's rights arising
from the tenancy will no longer be sufficient to give the fixture financer
priority over a subsequent mortgagee.
A second problem arises when the tenant has no right to remove
the fixture under the lease or under the landlord and tenant law of the
jurisdiction in question,175 but the fixture seller has filed a notice of the
security interest in the proper land registry office. The language used
in subsections 36(1), (3), and (4) would seem to give fixture financers
the right to remove the fixtures irrespective of the rights or reliance
170 See Cormier, supra, note 8 at 170.
171 McLaren I, supra, note 8 at § 6.03[l][b][i]; McLaren II, supra, note 8 at 250; White &
Summers, supra, note 25 at 933; Adams, supra, note 7 at 863. Cf Gordon, supra, note 12 at
669, where Professor Gordon argues that "the UCC's seeming obliviousness to the common law
and the incongruity of its results give rise to a suspicion that the UCC does not deal with ...
[tenants' fixtures] at all."
172 See notes 158 to 161, supra and accompanying text.
173 See notes 162 to 167, supra and accompanying text.
174 Section 36(3)(a).
175 For example, tenants lose the right to remove their fixtures where they have mortgaged
their leasehold (see note 160, supra) or where they have abandoned their premises prior to the
end of the term (see, eg., Veterans Manufacturing and Supply Co. v. Harris, supra, note 49; Nellis
v. McNee (1906), 7 O.W.R. 158 (Weekly Ct.)) or where removal will cause substantial damage
to the freehold (see note 51, supra).
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interests landlords and those claiming under them might have as against
their tenants. Although the need to provide fixture financers with protection
is recognized, their right to prevail becomes more tenuous when a landlord
is able to show that the tenant received a reduction in rent because
the fixtures had been installed or that the landlord had acquired a
substantial reliance interest in some other way. Furthermore, if one accepts
the view that compliance with section 36 gives a chattel encumbrancer
a right of removal irrespective of the tenant's rights, then one is implicitly
saying that the chattel encumbrancer can, by properly filing, obtain greater
rights to remove the fixtures than the tenant would have against the
landlord or the mortgagee. 176 Yet under landlord and tenant law, a tenant's
chattel encumbrancer usually has no greater rights than the tenant, except
for a short opportunity to remove the fixtures if the tenant loses the
right of removal by voluntarily surrendering the premises prior to the
end of the lease.177
Were such changes in the substantive law of landlord and tenant
intended by the drafters? It is very doubtful. Rather, the drafters simply
did not consider the application of section 36 to cases involving tenants'
fixtures.178 Additionally, real estate interests would probably not have
acquiesced so easily if the change in the law of landlord and tenant,
as illustrated in the second problem, had been more widely known to
them. Such a significant change should not be made without a thorough
airing of the problem.
If the present section introduces too much uncertainty as to the
application of section 36 to tenants' fixtures or makes too many
undesirable changes with respect to landlord and tenant law, then some
alterations to the section will be required. One possible solution would
176 Professor McLaren has suggested that a fixture financer may have greater rights against
a real estate interest than does a tenant under landlord and tenant law because the secured party's
rights are statutorily based while the tenant's rights arise only out of the common law (see McLaren
IL supra, note 8 at 249). This argument, however, would only be persuasive if one could show
that the Legislature (or, more accurately, the drafters) contemplated such a change. In reality, no
such change was even considered. See note 178, infra and accompanying text. Surprisingly, there
are no cases that consider this issue under the Conditional Sales Act. One commentator, however,
asserts that a general reading of all the cases indicates that a conditional seller's right of removal
will continue even if the tenant's right to remove fixtures does not exist: Campbell, supra, note
23 at 60.
177 See London & Westminster Loan and Discount Co., Ltd v. Drake, supra, note 156; Joseph
Hall, supra, note 46; Saint v. Pil!ey (1875), L.R. 10 Exch. 137 at 139.
178 The drafters of the 1962 Code have said that they do not recall this problem being discussed:
Gilmore, supra, note 11 at 833. Given that the PPSA is based substantially upon the 1962 Code
and that neither the Catzman Committee (in Catzman et aL, supra, note 1) nor McLaren, a member
of the Committee (in McLaren I, supra, note 8), give any indication of having considered this
problem, it seems safe to assume that it was not discussed by the Ontario drafters.
[VOL 24 No. 3
Ftxture Financing Under the PPSA:
be to adopt the approach taken in the 1972 Code. Section 9-313(5)(b),
which deals with both of these problems, provides:
A security interest in fixtures, whether or not perfected, has priority over the
conflicting interest of an encumbrancer or owner of the real estate where ...
the debtor has a right to remove the goods as against the encumbrancer or owner.
If the debtor's right terminates the priority of the security interest continues for
a reasonable time. 17
9
Regarding the first problem, the section has been drafted specifically
to deal with tenants' fixtures.180 The provision also overcomes the second
problem by clarifying the priorities between fixture security and real
estate interests without otherwise disturbing the substantive law that
applies to such fixtures. A fixture financer will prevail over a real estate
interest (whether or not a real estate notification has been filed) so long
as the tenant-debtor has in law a right of removal against that real estate
party. As was shown earlier, the courts have been very generous to
tenants.18' The continuation of the secured party's priority "for a reasonable
time" after the debtor's right of removal terminates can be justified on
the grounds that the fixture lender needs some time to learn of the
termination of the debtor's right of removal and to initiate proceedings
to enforce the security interest.
VI. GOODS AFFIXED BY CONTRACTORS
A. The Problem" Lack of Protection for a Landowner Against a
Contractor under Section 36
The second major situation in which goods are affixed to land by
someone who does not own the real estate concerns goods affixed by
contractors. In a typical situation, a builder and a landowner enter into
a contract in which the owner agrees to pay a fixed price for the
construction. The total price usually includes not only the cost of the
labour and equipment, but also all the materials that are to become part
of the completed structure. The contractor may, however, purchase some
of the materials subject to a security interest in favour of the supplier.
In such a case, what protection do landowners who have paid contractors
in expectation of receiving unencumbered property have? Moreover, are
179 1972 Code, supra, note 14, § 9-313(5)(b).
180 while the section's principal application will probably be in dealing with tenants' fixtures,
it can also be used by a licensee or an owner of an easement who have affixed goods to the
land: ibid. at 114.
181 See text accompanying notes 172 & 173, supra. See generally Niles, supra, note 39 at
570-74; Oosterhoff & Rayner, supra, note 23 at 1047-54.
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landowners in any better position if, under the contract, they make their
payments to the contractor after the goods have been installed and without
knowledge of the outstandingsecurity interests in those fixtures?
Of course, the landowner can bring an action against the contractor
who has acquired the fixtures subject to a security interest for breaching
the contract. This, however, is usually of small comfort to the landowner
because by then the contractor is in default with the supplier and is
probably on the verge of bankruptcy. t82 Moreover, the contract is not
enforceable against third parties such as the supplier or conditional seller.
A literal reading of section 36 suggests that the PPSA does not afford
the landowner any protection. In those instances when the landowner
has paid the contractor before the encumbered goods are affixed to the
land, section 36(1) gives priority to the fixture supplier. Even when the
landowner waits until after the goods are installed before paying the
contractor (and payment is made without knowledge of the encumbrance),
the landowner can only succeed if the exceptions in section 36(3) apply.
Unfortunately, unless a court is bold enough to "jump the hurdle,"'183
it is unlikely to regard the landowner as a subsequent purchaser for
value of an interest in the realty (section 36(3)(a)) or a creditor with
a prior encumbrance of record on the realty (section 36(3)(c)). Yet, unlike
most real estate parties who claim an interest in the fixtures only because
they have an interest in the real property, the landowner in the contractor
example claims an interest in the fixtures themselves or qua buyer under
a contract with the builder. Thus, the equities in this particular case
are even more in favour of the landowner than they are in the case
of a construction mortgagee, and the latter is provided some protection
under the PPSA. In fact, the supplier's interest has been referred to as
being "the worst kind of secret lien." 184 Therefore, some form of protection
should be provided to the landowner. It is surprising that the Act fails
182 See, eg., Manning (C.A.), supra, note 8 at 69; Camco Inc. v. Frances Olson Realty (1979)
Ltd (1986), 6 P.P.S.A.C. 167 at 172 (Sask. C.A.) [hereinafter Camco Ina].
183 Gilmore, supra, note 11 at 834. Professor Gilmore suggests that under these very peculiar
circumstances, a "creditor" as referred to in s. 36(3)(c) should be construed to include an 'owner.
In other words, he continues, "the case of an owner, which is evidently on all fours with that
of the mortgagee, [should] be treated as a casus omissus, so that the rule protecting advances
under prior mortgages may be applied by analogy." See also Gordon, supra, note 12 at 669-70,
who argues that this case should be treated as casus omissus. However, he believes that it should
be determined by non-Code law and not by s. 36(3)(c).
184 Gordon, supra, note 12 at 669.
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to deal explicitly with this situation because the Conditional Sales Act
did appear to address this problem. 85
B. Availability of Protection for the Landowner Under Other Provisions
of the PPSA
Commentators, horrified by the anticipated result of the fixture
section in respect of goods affixed by contractors, have suggested several
arguments that a sympathetic court might accept to allow a landowner
to prevail over a supplier's security interest. First, the landowner can
argue that the goods affixed to the realty are not fixtures but building
materials. Accordingly, the PPSA does not apply and the secured party
may not remove the goods unless the landowner consents or unless some
other statute, such as the Construction Lien Act,186 permits such action. 187
However, as explained above, 8 8 if the courts interpret the section as
contemplated by the drafters, the term 'building materials' will be
construed much more narrowly than has been done in the past.
If the court holds that the collateral is a fixture then the landowner
can argue that by virtue of section 27(1) the supplier or fixture financer
has a security interest not in the goods sold but in the proceeds. Like
the inventory financing arrangement to which section 27 is most ap-
plicable, an examination of the entire supplier-contractor arrangement
shows that the parties' intention is that the contractor is to dispose of
the goods to the landowner; that is, "the secured party [the supplier]
expressly or impliedly authorized such dealing" between the debtor (the
contractor) and the buyer (the landowner).189 It follows then that the
secured party has lost the security interest in the goods, giving priority
185 Section 14(3) of the Conditional Sales Act, supra, note 4, provided that "Itihe registration
of a contract [presumably meaning that a notice of the contract was to be registered] under this
section shall be deemed to be actual notice to the owner of the land or an interest therein or
to a subsequent purchaser, mortgagee or other encumbrancer of the land or an interest therein."
[Emphasis added.] Since s. 10 is subject to s. 14, a court could hold that the landowner has a
right to retain the fixture without paying the balance (as is required under s. 10) unless the supplier
has registered the contract. See Murphy Wall Bed Co., supra, note 52 at 108, where Mr. Justice
Ferguson for the Ontario Court of Appeal said in obiter that if the contract is not filed then the
vendor has no right to remove the goods affixed to the realty. See also Campbell, supra, note
23 at 59, 61.
186 Supra, note 27.
187 See, ag., Manning (C.A.), supra, note 8 at 73-74, where Monnin CJ.M. said, as obiter,
that with the exception of the gas furnace and water heater most of the items that the contractor
intended to remove were "building materials," and thus they were not subject to removal as fixtures.
In a separate and concurring judgment, O'Sullivan J.A. said (at 78), as obiter, that he had no doubt
that in this country a furnace and water heater were regarded as part of a house (La, building
materials) and not as fixtures.
188 See notes 37 and 38, supra and accompanying text.
189 PPSA, s. 27(1)(a).
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to the holder of the real estate interest.190 Section 27(1), however, gives
the supplier a security interest in the proceeds, which can be perfected
under section 27(2).191
A third line of defence advocated by a number of commentators192
would claim that the owner's position is analogous to that of a buyer
in the ordinary course of business who, under section 30(1) of the PPSA,
takes free of security interests created by the seller. The section, however,
is poorly drafted and leaves a great many questions unanswered. The
question that is most relevant to the current discussion is whether the
disposition of goods in the ordinary course of business must be a "sale"
as defined by the Sale of Goods Act.193
A contract for the sale of goods, in Anglo-Canadian law, "is a contract
whereby the seller transfers or agrees to transfer the property in goods
to the buyer for a money consideration, called the price."'194 One of the
four features that courts use to differentiate a "sale" from other types
190 See, eg., Manning (Q.B.), supra, note 8 at 249-51; Delton Cabinet v. Yorkville Homes Ltd
(1985), 65 A.R. 384 (Alta. Q.B.), where a sub-contractor had installed kitchen cabinets into a
house being constructed by a builder. The builder sold the lot and the house to a buyer. The
Court refused the sub-contractor's application to remove the cabinets because, inter alia, the builder
was a mercantile agent of the kind contemplated by s. 2(1) of the Factors Act, R.S.A. 1980, c. F-1.
It therefore follows from the authorities, the court said (at 386), that the sub-contractor has "clothed
... [the builder] with implied authority to sell the cabinets and to transfer a good title free from
the encumbrance to a bona fide purchaser who has no knowledge of the existence of the encumbrance."
191 For a discussion of many of the problems inherent in this section, see J. Alpert, "Perfection
and Tracing of Proceeds Under the Personal Property Security Act" (1984) 9 Can. Bus. LJ. 467
and J.S. Ziegel, "The Quickening Pace of Jurisprudence Under the Ontario Personal Property Act"
(1980) 4 Can. Bus. LJ. 54 at 78-81. Many of these problems will, however, be eliminated by
changes recommended by the Advisory Committee: 1985 Draft Act, supra, note 15 at 35-37.
192 Leary & Ruccj, supra, note 97 at 394; Kripke, supra, note 11 at 69-70. See also McLaren
UI, supra, note 8 at 254 n.76.
193 Supra, note 89, s. 2(1).
Other serious ambiguities in this section include: (1) the meaning of "ordinary course of business"
(see B. Clark, The Law of Secured Transactions Under the Uniform Commercial Code (Boston: Warren,
Gorham & Lamont, 1980); 1985 Cumulative Supplement No. 3 at § 3.41[1]; McLaren I, supra,
note 8 at § 12.05[2][a]; but 4 Camco Inc, supra, note 182 at 186-87); (2) whether the buyer
must be a purchaser "in good faith" and "without notice" of the outstanding security interest (see,
eg., Fairline Boats Ltd v. Leger (1980), 1 P.P.S.A.C. 218 at 227-28 (Ont. H.C.) (by implication));
(3) whether the buyer's consideration must be executed before the buyer receives notice of the
seller's defective title (cf the definition of "value" in s. l(z) of the PPSA and the expanded meaning
in s. 1(1) of the 1985 Draft Act, supra, note 15; see also J.S. Ziegel, "The Legal Problems of
Wholesale Financing of Durable Goods in Canada" (1963) 41 Can. B. Rev. 54 at 95, where he
discusses this problem with respect to the old "trader's" section in the conditional sales legislation);
and (4) whether the security interest must be created by the seller (see Clark, ibid, at § 3A[3]
and the cases cited therein, which applied the rule that buyers in the ordinary course of business
are not protected against a security interest created by a former owner who is not their seller
and the few cases in which the buyer was able to prevail by arguing a different theory (eg., acquiescence
on the part of the bank; agency relationship between the two dealers so that the first dealer was
in reality the 'seller'; and an entrustment theory based on ss. 2-403(2) & (3) which provides that
a person who "entrusts" the possession of goods to a dealer loses title to a buyer in the ordinary
course from the dealer)),
194 SGA, ibid, s. 2(1).
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four features that courts use to differentiate a "sale" from other types
of contracts is that the subject matter of the contract must be goods.
195
Contracts between a contractor and a landowner, however, have generally
been held by the courts to be contracts for work and labour or for the
provision of services as opposed to contracts of sale of goods.19 6 Therefore,
if section 30(1) only protects a buyer whose transaction is a sale as
defined by the Sale of Goods Act, then the protection afforded by section
30(1) will not apply to a contract between the contractor and the
landowner.
A technical sale should not be a prerequisite for a buyer to be afforded
protection by section 30(1) of the PPSA. A sale is really a species of
contract law. Although many of the rules of contract apply generally
to all sales, some rules have been statutorily enacted orjudicially developed
and now only apply to sales of particular types of property. As a result,
different principles of law exist depending upon the type of property
involved (goods, land, services, leasehold interests, choses in action,
negotiable instruments, and so on). The language and judicial interpre-
tation of the Sale of Goods Act clearly show that the hallmark and primary
purpose of a contract of sale of goods is the transfer of property in
the goods from one person to another. 97 The passing of property in
195 The other three essential features of a sale of goods are a purchase, the passing of property,
and the payment of money for such goods. See generally G.H.L. Fridman, Sale of Goods in Canada,
3d ed. (Toronto: Carswell, 1986) at 11-23. "Goods" are defined in s. l(1)(g) of the SGA to include
"all chattels personal, other than things in action and money and includes emblements, industrial
growing crops, and things attached to or forming part of the land that are agreed to be severed
before sale or under the contract of sale."
196 See, ag., Allis-Chalmer-Bullock Co. v. Walker (1910), 15 W.L.R. 357 (C.A.) (contract for
supply and installation of machinery for operating lighting and ventilating plant; held not a sale
but a contract for work and materials); Lundrigan's Ltd v. Newfoundland (1975), 15 Nfld. & P.E.I.R.
467 at 483-85 (Nfld. T.D.) (contract to manufacture and install concrete panels; held SGA is not
generally applicable to construction contracts); Scott Maritimes Pulp Co. v. B.E Goodrich Canada
Ltd (1977), 19 N.S.R. (2d) 181 at 196-97 (C.A.) (installation of rubber cover on a press roll;
held not a sale); RE Nowell Fisheries Ltd v. Gow (1983), 22 B.L.R. 179 (N.S.T.D.) (contract for
supply and installation of freezer system not constituting a contract for sale of goods). Cf Unident
Ltd v. DeLong Joyce and Ash Temple Ltd (1981), 50 N.S.R. (2d) 1 at 4 (N.S.S.C.) (supply and
installation of dental office equipment constituting a contract for the sale of the goods, the installation
work being only incidental to the purchase). See also A.G. Guest, ed., Benjamin's Sale of Goods,
2d ed. (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 1981) at § 42 and cases cited therein. And see Leary & Rucci,
supra, note 97 at 394, where they argue that even if the contract is not strictly a sale of goods,
the policy behind § 9-307(1), comparable to s. 30(1) of the PPSA, "cries out for the application
of the rule of the subsection by analogy, or by ruling that for section [30(1)] purposes a construction
contract 'includes' a contract of sale." In support of the latter proposition, the authors (at 394
n. 87a) cite Vonins Inc v. Raf (1968), 101 NJ. Super. 172, which held that a plumbing installation
contract includes a sale of fixtures for the purpose of § 2-326.
In distinguishing between a contract of sale of goods and one for work and materials, Canadian
courts consider whether the primary objective of the contract is the transfer of title in something
that was not originally the property of the buyer. If so, the contract will be one of a sale of goods.
Alternatively, if the primary purpose of the contract is the performance of certain work or services
and the fact that title has passed is only incidental, then the contract will not be one of a sale
of goods: Fridman, ibid at 25.
197 Fridman, ibid at 12, 15, 31-32, 101-104.
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the goods is important because this step gives rise to the proprietary
and contractual rights and duties that are contained in the Sale of Goods
Act19
8
The underlying policy of section 30(1) of the PPSA is, however, very
different from that found in the Sale of Goods Act. Section 30(1)
encourages the marketability of goods and protects the reliance interests
of buyers who assume that sellers will use the proceeds of the sales
to repay any liens on the property sold. 199 The provision should, therefore,
be interpreted liberally in their favour. In fact, the Ontario Court of Appeal
in International Business Machines Co. v. Guelph Board of Education200
and in Dominion Lock Joint Pipe Co. v. York20 broadly interpreted a
comparable section in the former Conditional Sales Act.202
In the York case, a contractor purchased some sewer pipes from
the plaintiff on a conditional sales agreement. These pipes were then
installed by the contractor in the defendant's sewage system. When the
contractor failed to pay the amount owing on the pipes, the plaintiff
sought to recover its goods from the defendant. The defendant argued,
inter alia, that it was protected by the trader's provisions of the Conditional
Sales Act.203 The plaintiff denied that the defendant could be protected
by this section on the ground that there was no technical sale between
the contractor and the defendant. In rejecting the plaintiffs argument,
Mr. Justice Middleton, speaking for the Court, first explained that the
section was introduced to protect innocent buyers and therefore should
be interpreted broadly in their favour.204 He then responded to the plaintiff's
198 Ibid. at 31-32.
199 See, eg., Fairline Boats Ltd v. Leger, supra, note 193 at 220-21, where Mr. Justice Linden
stated that
[t]he objective of this section, as I understand it, is to permit commerce to proceed expeditiously
without the need for purchasers of goods to check into the titles of sellers in the ordinary
course of their business. Purchasers are allowed by our law to rely on sellers using the
proceeds of sales to repay any liens on the property sold. In these days inventory is almost
invariably financed, and as a result is almost invariably subject to liens of one kind or
another. To require searches and other measures to protect lenders in every transaction
would stultify commercial dealings, and so the Legislature exempts buyers in the ordinary
course of business from these onerous provisions, even where they know that a lien is in
existence. The risk is placed on lenders of an occasional dishonest dealer who may sell
some of his goods in the ordinary course of business and then fail to repay the debt because
"he is in a much better position than the buyer to weigh the risk."
See also Camco, supra, note 182 at 181, 186; Ziegel, supra, note 193 at 85-86.
200 (1927), [1927] 4 D.L.R. 632, affd (1928), [1928] S.C.R. 200.
201 Supra, note 115.
202 Section 3(4) of the Conditional Sales Act, R.S.O. 1914, c. 136 provided that: "where such
trader or other person resells the goods in the ordinary course of his business, the property in
and ownership of such goods shall pass to the purchaser notwithstanding that the provisions of
this Act have been complied with."
203 Ibid.
204 Supra, note 115 at 808.
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argument that the contract was not a sale as defined by the Sale of
Goods Act but a contract for the construction of the sewer by stating:
[wlhile this is in one sense so, it was unquestionably part of the contract that
the title to the goods should pass to the [defendant], and this amounts to a resale
within the meaning of the ... [Conditional Sales Act]. This view is, I think, in
accordance with that entertained by this court in International Business Machines
v. Guelph Board of Education.
20 5
In the Guelph case,206 Mr. Justice Ferguson for the Ontario Court
of Appeal said that the court should give the words of the statute "their
grammatical and natural meaning and effect," given that section 3(4)
of the Conditional Sales Act was "designed and intended to protect
purchasers rather than vendors."2
07
As the two cases clearly illustrate, goods are frequently distributed
in ordinary business transactions that do not conform to a technical sale
of goods. No purpose can be advanced to explain why only "buyers"
as defined by the Sale of Goods Act should be protected, instead of all
buyers. The opportunities for deception appear to be the same in both
instances.208 A construction contract between a contractor and a landowner
should be viewed as a sale within the meaning contemplated by section
30(1) of the PPSA. 209
A fourth argument will also be possible once the 1985 Draft Act
is passed. In the 1985 Draft Act, the term "debtor" means not only "a
person who owes payment or other performance of the obligation
secured" 210 but also the owner of the collateral when the debtor does
205 Dominion Lock Joint Pipe Co. v. York, ibid
206 Supra, note 200. In that case, the plaintiff conditionally sold some clocks to a dealer
of electrical supplies who was to install them in the defendant's building.
207 Ibid at 634 (Ont. C.A.).
208 Ziegel, supra, note 193 at 88-89.
209 See, eg., O'Dell v. Kunkel's Inc. (1978), 24 U.C.C. Rep. 227 at 231 (Okla. S.C.), where
the security interest of a contractor who installed the plumbing, central heating, and air conditioning
into a residence was discharged by virtue of § 9-307 of the 1962 Code (the equivalent of s. 30(1)
of the PPSA) when the builder sold the house.
In Manning (Q.B.), supra, note 8 at 251, Mr. Justice Scollin did not consider whether s. 30(1)
was limited to sales as defined by the sGA. He said that s. 30(1) of the Manitoba PPsA was not
applicable because the sale of heating equipment by a home builder was not in the ordinary course
of business. This cannot be correct since an agreement with a builder includes not only the construction
of the shell of the house but also the furnishing of heating equipment and other articles which
are all necessary to make a house a home. See, for example, Delton Cabinet Manufacturing Ltd
v. Yorkville Homes Ltd, supra, note 190 at 386, where the encumbrance of a sub-contractor who
installed kitchen cabinets into a new house was discharged by virtue of s. 2(1) of the Factors
Act when the house was sold. This was so because, inter alia, the builder "was in possession of
the cabinets in its capacity as a mercantile agent and sold these cabinets as part of the home
to [the buyer of the house] in the ordinary course of its busines." [Emphasis added.]
210 The same wording for this portion of the definition is presently found in s. 1(g) of the
current Act. See PPSA, s. l(g).
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not own the collateral.211 A serious question then arises as to whether
the financing statement and the real estate notification, which refer only
to the contractor, and the security agreement, which is signed only by
the contractor, would be effective under the 1985 Draft Act because
they do not involve all of the "debtors". Right from the start a manifest
intention that the landowner is to have ownership rights in the collateral
is clear. In fact, once the goods are affixed and payment has been made
by the landowner, the latter will have exclusive rights in the collateral
as against the contractor. Therefore, when ownership is divided or when
only one part owner owes the money, both should be considered debtors
for the purposes of the 1985 Draft Act. Subsequently, both would have
to be referred to in the financing statement and in the real estate notification
and, more importantly, both would have to sign the security agreement.212
Was such an interpretation contemplated by the drafters? Arguably,
"debtor" does not mean the same thing in all contexts. One could say
that the expanded definition of "debtor" is applicable only in Part V
of the 1985 Draft Act (dealing with the rights and duties of the secured
party and the debtor on default). In other cases, such as the registration
requirements and the formal requisites for security agreements, the
customary meaning of the term "debtor" is more appropriate. The
commentary of the drafters of the 1985 Draft Act seems to indicate
that they did not contemplate that all of the parties set out in the definition
of "debtor" should qualify as debtors under all of the applicable provisions;
only under those sections found in Part V of the 1985 Draft Act was
the expanded definition for "debtor" to apply.213
Nevertheless, acceptance of the broader construction becomes more
likely in light of the situation facing the court: the suppliers know that
the goods are to be installed on the land; the landowners have no way
of ensuring that the goods are free of a security interest because the
suppliers have not used the means available to them to give the owner
at least constructive notice of the security interest.214 By expanding the
211 1985 Draft Act, supra, note 15, s. I(I) at 2-3. The exact wording of this last portion
of the definition is as follows: "where the person who owes payment or other performance of
the obligation secured is not the owner of the collateral, 'debtor' includes ... an owner of the
collateral in any provision of this Act dealing with [the] collateral..." [Emphasis added.]
212 A similar argument has been made with respect to the 1962 Code. See Leary & Rucci,
supra, note 97 at 394-95. See, ag., KNC Wholesale Inc. v. AWMCO, Inc (1976), 18 U.C.C. Rep.
1303 at 1306-7 (Cal. C.A.) and White Star Distributors; Inc v. Kennedy (1978), 25 U.C.C. Rep.
1446 at 1448 (N.Y.S.C. App. Div.) where both courts held that where the debtor and the owner
of the collateral are not the same person, both names must appear on the financing statement
in order to perfect the security interest. See also R.A. Anderson, Anderson on the Uniform Commercial
Code, vol. 4, 2d ed. (Rochester. Lawyers Co-operative, 1971) at § 9-402:20 and cases cited therein.
213 Supra, note 15 at 7. Cf McLaren I, supra, note 8 at § 1.09[8], and see also the cases
cited in note 212.
214 See text accompanying note 184, supra.
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definition of "debtor," the 1985 Draft Act would force the supplier to
notify the landowner and, in effect, to obtain the owner's prior consent
before affixing the goods to the owner's property. To require the supplier
to do this seems reasonable in the circumstances.
A fifth argument was considered and accepted by Mr. Justice Scollin
of the Manitoba Queen's Bench in Manning v. Furnasman Heating Ltd2
t5
The conditional sales agreement in Manning involved the future sale
and installation of the fixtures, and the judge concluded that the builder
could not have acquired any rights in the specific heating equipment
until the goods had been installed. He reasoned that because a security
interest did not attach before the goods became fixtures, it must have
attached after they became fixtures.216 Since this was a post-affixation
security interest, he concluded that section 36(3) of the Manitoba Act
applied217 and not section 36(2)218 as the contractor had argued. Under
section 36(3) a secured party with a post-affixation security in fixtures
could only prevail over a person with a pre-existing registered interest
in the real estate if the secured party had entered into a priority agreement
with the real estate party. Having failed to conclude such an agreement,
the contractor was not entitled to priority.
Although Scollin J.'s argument is initially attractive, it must ultimately
be rejected because his argument incorrectly applies the third element
for attachment ("the debtor has rights in the collateral").2 9 In all fairness
to the trial judge, determining when a debtor has acquired rights in the
collateral is not always an easy matter. However, the cases clearly indicate
that something less than legal title is necessary to satisfy section 12(1)(c).
220
Scollin J. was correct in holding that the builder did not have enough
rights for attachment when the contract was first made because the
215 Supra, note 8. The case was subsequently affirmed on other grounds by a majority of
the Court of Appeal. Cf O'Sullivan J.'s minority judgment where he said (at 78), inter alia, that
he adopts the reasons of the majority and of the trial judge.
216 Scollin J. said (ibid at 252) that although "[a] purist might suggest that the security interest
attached contemporaneously with the goods becoming fixtures ... the scheme of the [Manitoba
PPsA] does not recognize this nicety."
217 Section 36(3) of the Manitoba PPSA corresponds to s. 36(2) of the Ontario PPSA. Section
36(2) reads as follows:
Subject to subsection (3), a security interest that attached to goods after they became fixtures
has priority over the claim of any person who subsequently acquired an interest in the real
property, but not over any person who had a registered interest in the real property at the
time the security interest attached to the goods and who has not consented in writing to
the security interest or disclaimed an interest in the goods as fixtures.
218 Section 36(2) of the Manitoba Act is equivalent to s. 36(1) of the Ontario PPSA. Both
sections only apply to pre-affixation security interests in fixtures.
219 Section 12(1)(c). The other two elements are an intention to attach (s. 12(1)(a)) and the
giving of value (s. 12(1)(b)).
220 McLaren I, supra, note 8 at § 2.01[2] n.5.1 and cases cited therein.
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builder's equipment had not yet been identified or selected. However,
once the equipment was identified, selected, and delivered to the builder,
the builder had rights to the equipment even though it had not yet been
installed by the contractor.22' Even if Scollin J. was correct that the delivery
of the equipment did not give the builder sufficient rights in the collateral
for attachment, at some point as the equipment was being installed, but
before the equipment was transformed into a fixture, the builder must
have acquired the necessary rights to the equipment. In other words,
the security interest in the equipment attached at least a split second
before the equipment changed into a fixture. It follows, therefore, that
the priority rule in section 36(2) of the Manitoba PPSA for pre-affixation
security interests was the more appropriate section in this type of case.
Accordingly, the contractor would be given an automatic priority over
the pre-existing real estate interest unless one of the other four arguments
outlined above applied to subordinate the contractor's security interest
in the fixtures.
In summary, the failure of the Act to expressly protect the landowner
can be overcome by judicial construction. There are four possible
arguments that a court sympathetic to the landowner's position might
accept.222 If the courts take a contrary position, then clarifying amendments
should be enacted. One possible solution would be to require the supplier
to obtain the prior consent of the landowner before a fixture financer
would be allowed to remove the goods affixed to the owner's real estate.223
VII. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
The fixture section attempts to balance the reliance interests of both
the real estate and fixture parties. The section thus stimulates further
221 See, ag.,In re County Green Limited Partnership (1977),23 U.C.C. Rep. 168 at 172 (U.S.D.C.,
Va.), where at the very latest the debtor had acquired rights in the appliances when they were
delivered to the construction site; Galleon Industrie4 Inc. v. Lewyn Machinery Co., Inc. (1973), 12
U.C.C. Rep. 1224 (Ala. App.).
222 See, ag., Manning (Q.B.), supra, note 8 (supplier's security interest in the goods is discharged,
but continues in the proceeds); O'Dell v. Kunkel's Inc, supra, note 209 (landowner is a buyer in
the ordinary course of business); Manning (C.A.), supra, note 8 (Monnin CJ.M. holding, for the
majority, that most of the items installed by contractor had become building materials and O'Sullivan
LA., in a separate and concurring judgment, including in that list the furnace and water heater);
and the cases cited in note 212, supra (financing statement must name both the owner of the
collateral and the obligor on the debt as the "debtor" in order to perfect the security interest).
As stated above, this last argument can only be used once the 1985 Draft Act becomes law.
223 A similar result is now required in the United States. The 1972 Code's revision of the
priority rules, assuming that none of the exceptions in §§ 9-313(4)(c)(d) & (5) apply, forces the
supplier to obtain a prior written consent from the owner to prevail over the land interest. Such
a result is achieved because the general priority rule of the fixture section (§ 9-313(7)) subordinates
the fixture financer's interest to that of the real estate interest.
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investment throughout the economy by encouraging the commitment of
new capital to the improvement of real estate and the modernization
and expansion of industry while at the same time protecting the capital
that has already been invested. The Act achieves this by ushering in
some important substantive changes with respect to fixture law in Ontario.
Perhaps the most dramatic of these is that all fixture secured parties
may on the debtor's default remove the collateral from the real estate
irrespective of the economic loss to the realty.224 The secured party,
however, must reimburse the owner or encumbrancer of the real property
for the cost of repairing any physical injury to the realty caused by the
removal.225 In addition, the priority rules of the section primarily recognize
reliance interests and show an obvious preference for the purchase money
security interest. On the whole, the policy behind these rules is a sound
one.
Unfortunately, the section is not a panacea for the problems that
lurk in this complicated area of law. A number of these problems have
been identified and examined. Many of these problems can be resolved
by judicial construction. For others, however, legislative amendments or
precautionary measures by the fixture financer are necessary to make
the section more workable and trouble-free.
The Advisory Committee's recommendations contained in the 1985
Draft Act do not correct many of the inherent weaknesses in the section.
While the 1972 Code can be used to show how some of these problems
can be eliminated, it is also flawed by ambiguities and omissions. More
importantly, its general policy shift in favour of the real estate financing
community, necessary to meet that Bar's objections to the substance of
the previous Code, is contrary to the long-standing position in Ontario.
Thus, further analysis and discussion by the drafters and other interested
parties are required so that fixture financing in Ontario can be concluded
with "reasonable simplicity and certainty." 226 The need for clarity and
certainty in the PPSA is undoubtedly difficult to achieve but nonetheless
should be attempted. The need becomes particularly acute when one
is reminded that the Act's provisions will only be tested when the normal
224 Prior to the PPSA, only a conditional seller had a right of removal by virtue of s. 10(1)
of the Conditional Sales Act, supra, note 4. Other creditors, such as a chattel mortgagee, were
not given a similar right of removal either under the common law or under the Bills of Sale and
Chattel Mortgages Act, supra, note 4.
225 Under the common law, there does not appear to exist an express duty of reimbursement:
McLaren II, supra, note 8 at 261 n. 85. Cf Marke v. Houck and Winkler (1860), 19 U.C.Q.B.
164 at 168, where the defendant was entitled to remove articles affixed to the realty but was
liable in damages for disturbing the freehold. Damages were also possible for breach of covenants
to repair, leave in repair, or yield up in repair. With respect to this latter type of covenant, see
generally Oosterhoff & Rayner, supra, note 23 at 1059-61; Rhodes, supra, note 23 at § 13:3:12.
226 Catzman et aL, supra, note 1 at 3.
19861
604 OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL [VOL. 24 NO. 3
business relationship has collapsed and the rights of other parties have
become involved.
